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REGULATING FOR S USTAINABILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
As applied to the issue of land use and environmental regulation, this
article does not attempt to precisely define the terms "sustainability" or "car-
rying capacity," but borrows loosely from a variety of available definitions.
The United States Bureau of Reclamation defines carrying capacity as:
"[Tihe ability of a resource to accommodate a user population at a reasona-
ble threshold without the user population negatively affecting the resource
sustainability."'
A prevalent definition emanating from a 1987 U.N. conference (Sus-
tainable developments are those that "[meet] the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs")2 or
that of Rosenbaum, 1993 ("Sustainable means using methods, systems and
materials that won't deplete resources or harm natural cycles") 3 may be most
useful. For purposes of this article, sustainability is viewed as the level of
development and land use impacts that impacted ecosystems can tolerate
without unacceptable impacts. The government has been regulating devel-
opment based on these concepts for decades. Few would argue with the ba-
sic constitutionality of zoning-assuming it does not result in a "taking" of
private property-to prevent undue crowding or incompatible land uses, or
the denial of an environmental permit to prevent an unacceptable impact to
wetlands or endangered species.
As past and current losses and impacts to the nation's ecosystems and
farmlands continue to mount, the need for more aggressive land use and
permitting protection of land becomes apparent. Florida's environmental
laws, and the federal laws commonly impacting the use of land in Florida,
provide the government with the legal tools to protect diminishing natural
and financial resources. Legal authority exists to ensure that development
only proceed to the extent that it is fiscally and environmentally sustainable.
The applicable standards for governmental approval of land use plans
and development permits require the government to prevent scientifically
unacceptable impacts to the state's ecosystems. Agencies can, and should,
exercise their discretion using the precautionary principle as they apply and
implement pre-existing legal authorities and requirements to requests for
planning, zoning, and permitting approval.4 Most, if not all, land use and
1. Protect Lake Pleasant, L.L.C. v. Johnson, No. 07-454 PHX RCB, 2007 WL 1486869,
at *6 n.5 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2007).
2. See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT. OUR COMMON
FUTURE 43 (Oxford University Press 1987).
3. Marc Rosenbaum, Sustainable Design Strategies, SOLAR TODAY (Mar./Apr. 1993).
4. See discussion infra pp. 767-75.
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environmental laws provide a legal basis to prevent development that "goes
too far"5 and causes or contributes to an unacceptable environmental or other
public impact.6 Our entire system of environmental and land use laws is
based upon the premise that some environmental degradation must be al-
lowed in favor of property rights and population growth. Yet, each of those
laws sets standards, or thresholds, beyond which adverse impacts are not to
be allowed. Environmental permitting agencies should not issue permits that
could result in unsustainable individual or cumulative impacts. Planning
agencies should not approve land use plans that are not financially or envi-
ronmentally sustainable.
Land use plans now commonly restrict the timing of new development
to the availability of public facilities and services. As public service and
ecological capacity limits become more apparent, land use plans may increa-
singly need to restrict the overall number of approvals that can be granted, in
terms of annual or total amounts. Such planning efforts are controversial and
are likely subject to legal challenge by landowners and developers unen-
thused about the denial or strict limitation on whether, how much, or when
they can develop, and of course lend themselves to strong political debate.
The most stringent land use and environmental regulations-those
which facially preclude or severely limit development or intensive uses of
land, and those which, as applied, allow a landowner little or no such uses-
face acute property rights limitations. Yet, government regulations necessary
to ensure sustainability are not inherently invalid in the face of constitution-
ally protect private property rights, the right to travel, or other rights. Such
regulations raise those issues, as well as those related to "fair share" afforda-
ble housing responsibilities, basic substantive due process considerations,
and just plain uneasiness on the part of some judges and courts.7 But gov-
ernment's right to require full mitigation for public impacts, regulate to pre-
vent unacceptable impacts to human health and ecosystems, and limit devel-
opment stringently without violating private property rights is clear.8 The
most effective approach begins with large scale land use planning and eco-
system preservation, and implements permitting programs to prevent signifi-
cant adverse fiscal and ecological impacts resulting from planned develop-
ment.
5. This is the standard enunciated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922), for determining when a regulation amounts to a taking of private property.
6. See id. at 415-16.
7. See generally Tom Pierce, A Constitutionally Valid Justification for the Enactment of
No-Growth Ordinances: Integrating Concepts of Population Stabilization and Sustainability,
19 U. HAW. L. REV. 93 (1997).
8. Id. at 123.
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Rhetoric such as "We can't put up a gate; we have to put them some-
where," is inadequate to describe the reality of the government's options in
the face of population growth, or the importance of exercising those options.
There is no basic constitutional or human right for all who might want to live
in Florida to have their home in (a rapidly degraded or paved-over) paradise
subsidized by the government or the ecosystem. 9 At the same time, there
will be continued population growth, and important decisions need to be
made about where, when, and how that growth takes place, and government
can and must make those decisions. Constitutional and statutory law do not
render government helpless to sit back and allow land use impacts to reduce
the amount of ecosystem or farmlands beyond their essential thresholds and
overload its public facilities beyond acceptable limits. Environmental and
land use laws may validly preclude environmental impacts that are not sus-
tainable.
Section II of this article will provide a brief summary of the major land
use and environmental laws in Florida, including applicable federal law, and
how they authorize, and in most cases require, planning and permitting deci-
sions based upon the limits of ecosystems or public facilities to accommo-
date the expected impacts. Section HI will explore in more depth the details
of Florida's land use planning law-the Community Planning Act" as it ad-
dresses the role of population projections, environmental and other impacts,
and the provision of infrastructure and service demands of development.
Next, the article will discuss cases around the country and Florida that have
ruled upon the legality of limited growth and moratoria ordinances and dis-
cuss the property-rights-related implications of such ordinances. Finally, the
article will discuss the application of judicial standards of review to land use
and environmental permitting laws and individual actions that spring from or
require the application of scientific or technical professional judgment in
fields that are inherently subject to professional debate.
11. LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN FLORIDA LAW FOR ECOLOGICAL AND FISCAL
SUSTAINABILITY
Florida's natural resources are severely threatened by development,
roads, mines, and other impacts. Florida's water resources are suffering sig-
nificant harm,1 water quality continues to degrade, 12 wetland loss has been
9. See id. at 132-35. See infra pp. 755-56, for a discussion of the constitutional "right
to travel."
10. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3161, et. seq. (2011).
11. Christina A. Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA.
L. REV. 403, 405 (2009).
20111
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dramatic, 13 and rare and endangered wildlife habitat continues to dwindle.
Its wildlife face dreary prospects in a long, narrow peninsula fragmented by
roads, development, mines, large-scale active agriculture, and other uses
inconducive to the movement patterns of large and small wildlife) 4 "As in
the rest of the world, the loss of habitat quality and quantity is the biggest
threat to listed species in Florida."1 5 "Florida has been identified as the state
at greatest risk of losing its native habitats." 6
Achieving sustainability requires the combined exercise of land use
planning authority by local governments and the state, and permitting deci-
sions by regional and state agencies, as well as the federal government. It
starts with land use decisions of local governments about potential maximum
use and intensity based on the inherent suitability of the land under Chapter
163 of the Florida Statutes. The most fundamental questions about sustaina-
bility must first be asked at the planning stage where the big picture is in
focus and where land use impacts can be evaluated in conjunction with the
broad array of issues that are relevant under Chapter 163. Planning decisions
determine the type and intensity of land use and development, and therefore
set the course for sustainability or not. Bad planning decisions which create
inappropriate development expectations and corresponding property values
can render the permitting process little more than window-dressing. Good
planning allows environmental laws to effectively protect the public interest
at the detailed development approval level, allowing permitting agencies,
based on the standards applicable to environmental permits, to ensure that
the end result of development that is potentially suitable to the natural cha-
racter of the land and other characteristics does not result in unacceptable
environmental impacts. As to fiscal sustainability, the law provides ample
12. See Div. OF ENVTL. ASSESSMENT & RESTORATION, FLORIDA DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT.
INTEGRATED WATER QuALrTY ASSESSMENT FOR FLORIDA: 2010 305(B) REPORT AND 303(D)
LIST UPDATE 5, 19, 21-28, 127-138, 143-159 (2010).
13. See id. at 183, 189.
14. Jason Totoiu, Building a Better State Endangered Species Act: An Integrated Ap-
proach Toward Recovery, 40 ENvTL. L. REP. 10299, 10301 (2010). "In Florida alone, 114
species occur that are listed under the ESA." Id. (citing U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Species
Reports: Listings and Occurrences for Each State (2011), available at http://ecos.fws.govl
tess-public/pub/stateListingAndOccurrence.jsp?state=FL. "The state's Endangered and
Threatened Species Act (ETSA) lists 118 species, significantly more than the 23 species that
were originally listed as endangered in 1976 when the ETSA was enacted." Id. (citing FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 68A-27.01 1-.006 (2008)).
15. Id. (citing U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., Introduction, in MULTISPECIES RECOVERY
PLAN FOR SouTH FLORIDA 1: 1, 1: 16 (1999)).
16. Id. (citing REED Noss & ROBERT, DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, A STATUS REPORT ON
AMERICA'S VANISHING HABITAT AND WILDLIFE 12- 13 (1995)).
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support, particularly for local governments, for requiring that the fiscal im-
pacts of new development are fully mitigated by the developer.'7
A. The Florida Constitution
"It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural re-
sources and scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made for the abate-
ment of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise."18
B. Private Property Rights
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Graham v. Estuary Properties,
Inc., 9 held that a landowner does not possess an inherent property right to
substantially change the essential natural character of land and put it to a use
for which it is not inherently suitable: "An owner of land has no absolute
and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as
to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and which
injuries [sic] the rights of others. 2°
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a local land-use ordin-
ance, which precluded the erection of fences around single-family lots,
enacted to allow the endangered Florida Key deer to roam freely around its
spatially-diminished natural habitats. 2' Reversing the Third District Court of
Appeal's ruling that a landowner's property rights always trump the rights of
the public in environmental protection, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled
that, under the Florida Constitution, one does not trump the other and that
private property rights and the public interest are to be balanced.22
The Court held, "Landowners do not have an untrammeled right to use
their property regardless of the legitimate environmental interests of the
State., 23 Citing Article H, Section 7 of the Florida Constitution-the natural
17. See discussion of the Community Planning Act's provisions concerning the provision
of adequate infrastructure, concurrency, and the efficient provision of public facilities and
services, infra p. 754.
18. FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 7.
19. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981). In this case, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a
development order that required half of the owner's property (a large mangrove forest) to
remain in its natural state. Id. at 1382. Because the action served a legitimate governmental
purpose and allowed the landowner to enjoy an economically viable use, the court rejected the
takings claim. Id.
20. Id.
21. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 932, 934 (Fla. 1995).
22. Id. at 933.
23. Id.
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resource protection clause-the Court found that "the State has a legitimate
interest in protecting the natural habitat of the Keys and most especially of
the Key deer,"24 which the Court observed was "perilously close to extinc-
tion."25
Citing the natural resource provision of the Florida Constitution, 6 the
Court observed: "The clear policy underlying Florida environmental regula-
tion is that our society is to be the steward of the natural world, not its unrea-
soning overlord. 27
Citing Sarasota v. Barg,28 the Court remarked: "There is an obvious
public interest in such a policy, given the fact that environmental degradation
threatens not merely aesthetic concerns vital to the State's economy but also
the health, welfare, and safety of substantial numbers of Floridians. 29
C. Florida Law Protecting Wetlands and Water Quality and Quantity
Florida's Water Resources Development Act governs the use of Flori-
da's water resources. 30 "Under the Act, the Florida Department of Environ-
mental Protection (DEP) supervises five 'water management districts' ...
[which] have the responsibility for entire watersheds, which enhances their
ability to address ecosystemwide problems. 31
1. Environmental Resource Permit Laws: Chapter 373 of the Florida Sta-
tutes
Florida's Environmental Resource Permitting laws-combined wetland
and storm water permitting-protect water resources from development im-
pacts by precluding permitting authorization for ecological harm, which goes
beyond a point of acceptability.
32
24. Id. at 932. The Court stated, "The fact the land in question sits in an area of critical
state concern is crucial to the result in this case, because it identifies an environmental concern
unique to Big Pine Key." Id. at 932 n. 1.
25. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 931.
26. "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and
scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made for the abatement of air and water pollution
and of excessive and unnecessary noise ...." FLA. CONST., art. II, § 7.
27. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 932.
28. 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974).
29. Moorman, 664 So. 2d at 932.
30. Totoiu, supra note 14, at 10307 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373 (2009)).
31. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 373.044 (2010)).
32. FLA. STAT. § 373.016.
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a. The Environmental Resource Permit Public Interest Standard
The statutory "Public Interest" criteria for the approval of an
Environmental Resource Permit, which emphasizes the protection of natural
systems, requires cumulative and secondary impact analysis and mitigation
for unavoidable impacts, and requires projects to be not contrary to or clearly
in the public interest, protecting the state against unaccepable impacts to
wetlands and other water resources.33 On their face, these criteria support a
determination that a proposed project is not in the public interest if, based on
a preponderance of the evidence, its adverse environmental impacts exceed
those which the affected ecosystem can handle.
Section 373.414, Additional Criteria for Activities in Surface Waters
and Wetlands, provides:
(1) As part of an applicant's demonstration that an activity regu-
lated under this part will not be harmful to the water resources or
will not be inconsistent with the overall objectives of the district,
the governing board or the department shall require the applicant
to provide reasonable assurance that state water quality standards
applicable to waters as defined in s. 403.031(13) will not be vi-
olated and reasonable assurance that such activity in, on, or over
surface waters or wetlands, as delineated in s. 373.421(1), is not
contrary to the public interest. However, if such an activity sig-
nificantly degrades or is within an Outstanding Florida Water, as
provided by department rule, the applicant must provide reason-
able assurance that the proposed activity will be clearly in the
public interest.
(a) In determining whether an activity, which is in, on, or over
surface waters or wetlands, as delineated in s. 373.421(1), and is
regulated under this part, is not contrary to the public interest or
is clearly in the public interest, the governing board or the de-
partment shall consider and balance the following criteria:
1. Whether the activity will adversely affect the public health,
safety, or welfare or the property of others;
33. Richard Grosso, Land Planning and Population Growth-People vs. Diminishing
Resources: A Legal Case for Sustainable Planning Decisions, FLA. B. ENV'T & LAND USE
SECT. LAW, Aug. 21, 2008, at 1, available at http://elc-web.org/app/download/4804757804/
land-planning.pdf.
2O011]
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2. Whether the activity will adversely affect the conservation
offish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species,
or their habitats;
3. Whether the activity will adversely affect navigation or the
flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling;
4. Whether the activity will adversely affect the fishing or re-
creational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the ac-
tivity;
5. Whether the activity will be of a temporary or permanent
nature;
6. Whether the activity will adversely affect or will enhance
significant historical and archaeological resources under the pro-
visions of s. 267.061; and
7. The current condition and relative value of functions being
performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.
34
These criteria are to be considered and balanced. 35 While a negative af-
fect on any particular criteria does not necessarily render a project contrary
to the public interest, in any given case, one criterion may well be more criti-
cal than the other six. 36 An applicant must also prove compliance with the
public interest test on the whole.37
The law supports a denial of a wetland permit in cases of extreme dam-
age to environment that cannot be mitigated. 38 Florida's Department of En-
vironmental Protection Water Management Districts, when given authority
by the Legislature, can heighten permit requirements. 39 For example, the St.
Johns River Water Management District has authority to adopt proposed
rules defining areas within the district as hydrologic basins and establishing
more restrictive standards for issuing permits and development requirements
within those basins, where the Legislature provided "authority to identify
34. FLA. STAT. § 373.414(1), (1)(a) (emphasis added).
35. Higgins et al. v. Roberts et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 5045, 5047-48 (1987).
36. Id. at 5048.
37. Id. (applying the test to a proposal that would adversely impact the habitat of endan-
gered and threatened wildlife species).
38. 1800 Atl. Developers v. Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 552 So. 2d 946, 954 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam).
39. See id. at 955.
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geographic areas that require greater environmental protection and to impose
more restrictive permitting requirements in those areas. ' 4°
In Florida Power Corp. v. Department of Environmental Regulation,4'
the court upheld the Department's rejection of a hearing officer's recom-
mendation that a power company's project would have no adverse impact
and was not contrary to the public interest. 42 The court found competent,
substantial evidence to support the Department's emphasis on the lack of
type-for-type mitigation and the importance of ensuring actual offset for the
proposed destruction of six acres of forested wetlands for the benefit of the
plants and animals solely dependent on forested wetlands.43 One of the fac-
tors the court considered was the "edge effect," referring to the negative or
positive influences one ecosystem may have on adjacent ecosystems.44 The
court noted that the Department properly determined that the extent of the
impact on the environment from the destruction of the forest was a policy
matter and not a question of fact to be resolved by a hearing officer.45
b. Minimization and Avoidance
State ERP rules emphasize requiring a permit applicant to make all
practicable modifications to the development proposal that would avoid or
eliminate wetland impacts.46 These rule requirements that try to avoid wet-
land impacts altogether, and then require full mitigation to offset unavoidable
impacts are policy decisions to ensure the sustainability of wetland and water
resources.
47
40. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Consolidated-Tomoka Land Co., 717 So. 2d 72,
81 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
41. 638 So. 2d 545 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
42. Fla. Power Corp., 638 So. 2d at 561.
43. Id. at561-62.
44. Id. at 560.
45. Id. at 561.
46. See Orlando Cent. Park, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 9 F.A.L.R. 1305, 1319-20,
1330 (DOAH 1987); Dibbs v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Case No. 94-509 (DOAH Apr. 4, 1995);
VQH Dev., Inc., DOAH Case No. 92-7456, 15 F.A.L.R. 3407, 3411 (Dep't of Envtl. Prot.
Final Order, Aug. 13, 1993) aff'd 642 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Cnty. Line
Coal., Inc. v. Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., Case No. 98-2927 (DOAH 1999); see, e.g., FLA.
ADMIN CODE ANN. r. 62-312.060 (1998).
47. The Rules of the South Florida Water Management District state, "[P]rotection of
wetlands and other surface waters is preferred to destruction and mitigation due to the tempor-
al loss of ecological value and uncertainty regarding the ability to recreate certain functions
associated with these features." BASIS OF REVIEW FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES PERMIT
APPLICATIONS, SFWMD § 4.3 (2010).
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c. Mitigation Requirements to "Offset" Wetland Impacts
Florida's statutory approach to wetland mitigation fosters the sustaina-
bility of wetlands and water resources. If an application does not meet the
public interest test, the Department must consider mitigation. 48 The Depart-
ment "shall consider measures proposed by or acceptable to the applicant to
mitigate adverse effects that may be caused by regulated activity. 49
"[M]itigation must offset the adverse effects caused by the regulated activi-
ty."5° The rules require that the mitigation offset the impacts to the specific
functions of the specific wetlands being impacted.51 The mitigation must
address the negative factors in the public interest test which tipped the bal-
ance against the public interest.
5 2
In Florida Power Corp. v. Florida Department of Environmental Regu-
lation,53 the Department held that, although there is no absolute "no net loss"
standard for mitigation, the avoidance or minimization of net loss is an im-
portant guiding principle of mitigation.54 Since mitigation by preservation
necessarily results in loss of jurisdictional wetlands, the Department general-
ly accepts preservation mitigation only after on-site wetland creation and/or
enhancement is shown to be not feasible or not sufficient to tip the public
interest balancing test "scales" in favor of permit issuance.55
Florida law recognizes that some wetlands cannot be mitigated because
they are particularly unique or provide functions that cannot be re-created.
56
As Section 4.3 of the South Florida Water Management District's Basis of
Review makes clear:
In certain cases, mitigation cannot offset impacts sufficiently to
yield a permittable project. Such cases often include activities
which significantly degrade Outstanding Florida Waters, adversely
impact habitat for listed species, or adversely impact those wet-
48. FLA. STAT. § 373.414 (1)(b) (2010).
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. See Sw. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Charlotte Cnty., 774 So. 2d 903, 909 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2001); VQH Dev., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., DOAH Case. No. 92-7456, 15
F.A.L.R. 3407, at 3411 (Dep't of Envtl. Prot. Final Order Aug. 13, 1993) affd, 642 So. 2d
755 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Cnty. Line Coal., Inc. v. Sw. Fla. Mgmt. Dist., Case No. 98-
2927 (DOAH Mar. 18, 1999).
52. See generally McCormick v. City of Jacksonville, 12 F.A.L.R. 960 (Dep't of Envtl.
Prot. 1990).
53. 92 E.R. F.A.L.R. 56 (Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Regulation Final Order Apr. I1, 1992).
54. Id. at 20 (remanding for determination on the adequacy of proposed mitigation).
55. Id. at 17.
56. BASIS OF REVIEW FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE PERMIT APPLICATION § 4.3 (2010).
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lands or other surface waters not likely to be successfully re-
created.57
In these instances, water management districts and the DEP have the
discretion to reject a mitigation plan and deny a permit for any project that
otherwise does not eliminate or reduce harm to wetlands.58
d. Cumulative Impact Analysis
The cumulative impact analysis required for Florida wetland permitting
agencies is a sustainability threshold requirement for the wetland, water, and
related resources that would be impacted by proposed development
projects.59 Environmental Resource Permitting agencies must consider the
cumulative impacts of their permitting decisions.6 °
Section 373.414 (8)(a): Additional criteria for activities in surface wa-
ters and wetlands:
The governing board or the department, in deciding whether to
grant or deny a permit for an activity regulated under this part shall
consider the cumulative impacts upon surface water and wetlands,
as delineated in s. 373.421(1), within the same drainage basin as
defined in s. 373.403(9), of:
1. The activity for which the permit is sought.
2. Projects which are existing or activities regulated under this part
which are under construction or projects for which permits or de-
terminations pursuant to s. 373.421 or s. 403.914 have been
sought.
57. Id.
58. See Brown v. So. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., DOAH Case No. 04-000476 (Final Order
Sept. 13, 2004) (denying an ERP where it was determined that the proposed mitigation for a
dock project would not adequately offset impacts to a listed species of seagrass); Charlotte
Cnty. v. IMC-Phosphates Co., 4 E.R. F.A.L.R. 20 (Final Order Sept. 15, 2003) (denying an
application for an ERP where the applicant failed to provide reasonable assurances that its
mitigation proposal would maintain or improve the natural functions of the diverse types of
wetland systems present at the site prior to commencement of the project); Kramer v. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 2 E.R. F.A.L.R. 225, 236 (Final Order Feb. 26, 2002) (denying an ERP where the
mitigation plan was found inadequate and "experimental").
59. Sierra Club v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt., 816 So. 2d 687, 688 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).
60. Id. at 689.
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3. Activities which are under review, approved, or vested pursuant
to s. 380.06, or other activities regulated under this part which may
reasonably be expected to be located within surface waters or wet-
lands, as delineated in s. 373.421(1), in the same drainage basin as
defined in s. 373.403(9), based upon the comprehensive plans,
adopted pursuant to chapter 163, of the local governments having
jurisdiction over the activities, or applicable land use restrictions
and regulations.
61
Reported cases amply support the view that this consideration of cumu-
lative impacts is designed to prevent an end result for the impacted environ-
ment that exceeds its tolerance thresholds. In Florida Power Corp. v. De-
partment of Environmental Regulation,62 the First District rejected an as-
serted "de minimis exception" to the cumulative impact analysis requirement,
finding that such an exemption "would completely undercut the purpose of
the cumulative impact analysis required by section 403.919.:63
In McCormick v. City of Jacksonville,6 Florida's Governor and Cabinet,
sitting as the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLWAC),
recognized that cumulative impact analysis is necessary to "prevent piece-
meal destruction of the environment. '65 FLWAC stated, "without the ability
to consider the long term impacts of a project in combination with past and
reasonably likely similar projects in the area, the [] permitting agency would
be helpless to prevent the gradual elimination of environmental resources
through [] permits. ' '66
Perhaps the most explicit "sustainability" discussion is found in the case
of Broward County v. Weiss & South Florida Water Management District,
67
which defined unacceptable cumulative impacts as those which would place
the fish and wildlife dependant on the functions to be lost in jeopardy of col-
lapse.68 "Collapse would occur when the population no longer is sustainable
... [and] could lead to extirpation of the population from the Basin. 69
61. FLA. STAT. § 373.414(8)(a) (2010).
62. 638 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
63. Id. at 561.
64. 12 F.A.L.R. 960 (FLWAC Jan. 22, 1990).
65. Id.; Dione Carroll, Secondary Impacts in Environmental Resource Permitting: Yes-
terday, Today and Tomorrow, Mar. 1998 E.L.U.L.S. SEC. FLA. BAR http://www.eluls.
org/marl998_carroll.html.
66. Carroll, supra note 65.
67. DOAH Case No. 01-3373 (SFWMD Final Order No. 2002-184 FOF ERP, Nov. 14,
2002).
68. Id.
69. Id.
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2. Coastal Permitting
Florida also has a special dredge and fill permitting process for coastal
development. Among other things, it is the intent of Florida's coastal devel-
opment permitting process "to preserve and protect them from imprudent
construction which can jeopardize the stability of the beach-dune system,
accelerate erosion, . .. or interfere with public beach access."7 ° The statute
also expresses a legislative finding and intent that "[d]evelopment of coastal
areas should be both economically and environmentally sustainable, and
inappropriate growth in ecologically fragile or hazard-prone areas should be
discouraged., 71 The Legislature recognizes that the sand resources are an
"exhaustible resource.' 72
In order for a coastal permit to be issued, the application must meet the
Chapter 62B-33 design and siting requirements, which include a review of
the potential impacts to the beach dune system, adjacent properties, native
salt resistant vegetation, and marine turtles. 73 An applicant for a coastal per-
mit must "provide the Department with sufficient information . . . to show
that [any] adverse and other impacts associated with the construction have
been minimized and that the construction will not result in a significant ad-
verse impact.
74
Florida Administrative Code Rule 62B-41.003(2) prohibits coastal con-
struction resulting in a "significant adverse impact., 75 Florida Administra-
tive Code Rule 62B-41.005(2) provides that coastal construction shall be
"limited" and requires the applicant to state the necessity and justification for
coastal construction and the potential benefits or impacts to the coastal sys-
tem.
76
"Adverse Impacts" are impacts to the coastal system that may cause a
"measurable interference with the natural functioning of the coastal sys-
tem."77 "Significant Adverse Impacts" are impacts of such magnitude that
they may:
1. Alter the coastal system by:
a. Measurably affecting the existing shoreline change rate;
70. FLA. STAT. § 161.053(1 )(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
71. Id. § 161.72(m).
72. Id. § 161.144.
73. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62B-33.005(4)(a)-(h) (2010).
74. Id. r. 62B-33.005(2).
75. Id. r. 62B-41.003(2).
76. Id. r. 62B-41.005(2).
77. Id. r. 62B-41.002(19)(a).
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b. Significantly interfering with its ability to recover from a coastal
storm;
c. Disturbing topography or vegetation such that the dune system be-
comes unstable or suffers catastrophic failure.78
In Leto v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection,79 construc-
tion permits were denied because, among other reasons, "the structure, as
designed, failed to adequately protect local marine turtles."8
In Surfrider Foundation, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach,8' the Department
of Environmental Protection denied a coastal permit for a proposed beach
renourishment project based on several findings of adverse environmental
impact to the nearshore coastal resources.82 Among the findings supporting
the denial was that:
In the final revision of the Permit, Palm Beach and DEP re-
moved the monitoring requirements for the offshore reef. The un-
iqueness of this resource has been detailed above. Because of the
rare confluence of conditions required for its creation, the Florida
Reef Tract cannot be replaced in any timeframe short of geologic
time, so its protection, even from remote risks, must be a matter of
exceptional regulatory concern.
83
3. Water Quality
Florida Law states that "[e]xisting uses and the level of water quality
necessary to protect the existing uses shall be fully maintained and
protected."'
Chapter 403 of the Florida Statutes-Florida Air and Water Pollution
Control Act-recognizes that water bodies serve multiple beneficial uses that
must be protected to promote the public welfare, and established a policy to
"conserve the waters of the state and to protect, maintain, and improve the
quality thereof for public water supplies, for the propagation of wildlife and
fish and other aquatic life, and for domestic, agricultural, industrial, recrea-
tional, and other beneficial uses. '8' The Act empowers the Department of
78. Id r. 62B-33.002(33)(A)-(B).
79. 824 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
80. Id. at 284.
81. Surfrider Found., Inc., v. Town of Palm Beach, Case no. 08-1511 (DOAH Mar. 2,
2009).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 231.
84. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.300(14) (2010).
85. FLA. STAT. § 403.021(2) (2010).
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Environmental Protection to "[dlevelop . . . a grouping of the waters into
classes . . . in accordance with the present and future most beneficial uses,"
and to "[e]stablish ... water quality standards for the state as a whole or for
any part thereof."
86
The administrative rule that identifies five classes of waterbodies is
Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-302.400.87 Most waters are listed as
Class Il on the basis of the designated uses "Recreation, Propagation and
Maintenance of a Healthy, Well-Balanced Population of Fish and Wild-
life. 88 Others are classified as either Class I Potable Water Supplies, Class
II Shellfish Propagation or Harvesting, Class IV Agricultural Water Supplies,
or Class V Navigation, Utility, and Industrial Use.8 9 Most water quality cri-
teria are set as quantitative concentration standards, established based on a
determination of the level of pollution that can be accommodated by such
water bodies while protecting their designated uses.90 One criteria-for nu-
trients-is stated qualitatively: "Nutrients-in no case shall nutrient concen-
trations of a body of water be altered so as to cause an imbalance in natural
populations of aquatic flora and fauna."9'
The rules identify a special category for waters of special recreational or
ecological significance, known as "Outstanding Florida Waters" (OFWs).
Under Rule 62-302.700(1), "No degradation of water quality, other than that
allowed in subsections 62-4.242(2) and (3)," is permitted. 93 The rules prohi-
bit permits from being issued "for any proposed activity or discharge within
an [OFW], or which significantly degrades" an OFW, unless the permit ap-
plicant can affirmatively demonstrate that the proposed discharge is "clearly
in the public interest" and that "existing ambient water quality. .. will not be
lowered." 94 "Existing ambient water quality" is defined as "the better...
quality of either (1) that which could reasonably be expected to have existed
for the baseline year of an [OFW] designation or (2) that which existed dur-
ing the year prior to the date of [the] permit application. 95
86. Id. § 403.061(10), (11).
87. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.400(1).
88. Id. r. 62-302.400(1), (14).
89. Id. r. 62-302.400(1).
90. See id. r. 62-302.300(3).
91. Id. r. 62-302.530 (47)(b).
92. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-302.700(9).
93. Id. r. 62-302.700(1).
94. Id. r. 62-4.242(2)(a), (2)(a)2, (2)(a)2b.
95. Id. r. 62-4.242(2)(c).
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Rule 62-302.300(14) provides, "Existing uses and the level of water
quality necessary to protect the existing uses shall be fully maintained and
protected. 96
d. Consumptive Use Permit (CUP) Standards
The standard for the approval of a Consumptive (Water) Use Permit un-
ambiguously precludes the allowance of harm to the state's water resources:
The governing board or the department may require such permits
for consumptive use of water and may impose such reasonable
conditions as are necessary to assure that such use is consistent
with the overall objectives of the district or department and is not
harmful to the water resources of the area.9
7
"To obtain a permit pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, the applicant
must establish that the proposed use of water: (a) [i]s a reasonable-beneficial
use as defined in [section] 373.019; (b) [w]ill not interfere with any presently
existing legal use of water; and (c) [i]s consistent with the public interest."98
According to section 373.019(16), "reasonable-beneficial use" is defined as
"the use of water in such quantity as is necessary for economic and efficient
utilization for a purpose and in a manner which is both reasonable and con-
sistent with the public interest. ' '99
This standard implements the legislative "declaration of policy" set
forth in section 373.016 that:
(1) The waters in the state are among its basic resources. Such wa-
ters have not heretofore been conserved or fully controlled so as to
realize their full beneficial use.
(2) The department and the governing board shall take into ac-
count cumulative impacts on water resources and manage those re-
sources in a manner to ensure their sustainability. 
°°
In addition, it is state policy to "promote the conservation, replenish-
ment, recapture, enhancement, development, and proper utilization of surface
96. Id. r. 62-302.300(14).
97. FLA. STAT. § 373.219(1) (2010).
98. Id. § 373.223(1).
99. Id. § 373.019(16).
100. Id. § 373.016(l)-(2) (2010) (emphasis added).
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and groundwater"'0 1 and to "promote the availability of sufficient water for
all existing and future reasonable-beneficial uses and natural systems.' ' 2
These standards preclude the issuance of a CUP that would cause or
contribute to unacceptable environmental impacts. 10 3 The St. Johns River
Water Management District, for example, requires the applicant to reduce the
"environmental or economic harm caused by the consumptive use ... to an
acceptable amount."' ' The South Florida Water Management District re-
quires applicants to demonstrate the proposed water use will not cause signif-
icant saline water intrusion, adversely impact offsite land uses, cause pollu-
tion or cause adverse environmental impacts.0 5 Its rules also emphasize that
proposed withdrawals must not cause harm to environmental features such as
wetlands or other surface waters that are sensitive to the magnitude, seasonal
timing, and duration of inundation.' 0 6 In Pinellas County v. Lake Padgett
Pines,10 7 the court held that the statute requires the consideration of a pro-
posed well field's environmental effects beyond its impacts on the water
resource.1
0 8
Impacts to water quality resulting from the discharge after water has
been used, may provide a basis for denial of a consumptive use permit. 1°9
The adverse environmental effects of a land use supported by a proposed
consumptive use are also relevant. In In re South Dade Agro Homes, Inc.,' 0
a consumptive use permit was denied for an agricultural operation in undis-
turbed wetlands that were critical habitat for an endangered species because
significant harm to the habitat would result."' In Osceola County v. St.
Johns River Water Management District,1 2 a wellfield permit was denied
because of the likelihood of significant harm to wetlands." 13
101. Id. § 373.016(3)(b).
102. FLA. STAT. § 373.016(3)(d).
103. See Harloff v. City of Sarasota, 575 So. 2d 1324, 1326-27 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
104. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 40C-2.301(4)(d) (2010).
105. Id. r. 40E-2.301(l)(a)-(e).
106. BASIS OF REVIEW FOR WATER USE PERMIT APPLICATION WITHIN THE SOUTH FLORIDA
WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, § 4.2.2.4 (2010).
107. 333 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
108. Id. at 479.
109. Richard Hamann, Consumptive Use Permitting Criteria, FLA. B. FLA. ENVTL. &LAND
USE L. (Aug. 2001).
110. 7 F.A.L.R. 3645 (Final Order S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. June 13, 1985).
111. Id. at 3647-48.
112. 92 E.R. F.A.L.R. 109 (Final Order June 10, 1992).
113. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of Florida's consumptive use permitting law and
cases, see generally Hamann, supra note 109; Hamann & Ankersen, Water, Wetlands and
Wildlife: The Coming Crisis in Consumptive Use, 67 FLA. BAR J. 41 (March 1993).
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a. Water Reservation Rules
In addition to the criteria that govern individual applications for con-
sumptive use permitting, the State's Department of Environmental Protection
and its five water management districts are authorized to affirmatively "re-
serve" water (make unavailable to consumptive users) to protect fish and
wildlife. 1 4 Section 373.223(4) of the Florida Statutes states: "The govern-
ing board or the department, by regulation, may reserve from use by permit
applicants, water in such locations and quantities, and for such seasons of
the year, as in its judgment may be required for the protection offish and
wildlife or the public health and safety."'" 5
This statute provides the agencies "with a broad grant of authority to re-
serve water in order to protect fish and wildlife or to protect the public health
and safety." ' 1 6 In this case, the District Court upheld an administrative order
finding a reservations administrative rule valid."7 The Order upheld by the
Court's opinion had specifically found that restoring an environmental condi-
tion required for the health and sustainability of existing fish and wildlife
communities was authorized by the statute." 8
In Marion County v. Greene,"9 Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal
upheld the issuance of a Consumptive Use Permit, finding that the record
supported a determination that the permitting agency had complied with the
statutory conditions of approval in section 373.223(1) of the Florida Sta-
tutes, which the opinion appears to characterize as requiring the "sustainable
use" of water.' 20 The court rejected the permit challenger's claim that the
agency "has a duty to manage the water resources . . . to ensure their sus-
tainable use, including future increases in demand, and that the District vi-
olated that duty by granting [the permit]," by noting that the evidence dem-
onstrated that the proposed use "would have little or no impact on other wa-
114. FLA. STAT. § 373.223(4) (2010).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Ass'n of Fla. Cmty. Devs. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 943 So. 2d 989, 992-93 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. 5 So. 3d 775 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
120. Id. at 779-80. The agency St. Johns River Water Management District's formally
adopted rules stated that "In determining the public interest in consumptive use permitting
proceedings, the Board will consider whether an existing or proposed use is beneficial or
detrimental to the overall collective well-being of the people or to the water resources in the
area, the District and the State." Id. at 778.
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ter users because of the [limited allowable] withdrawal, even taking into ac-
count increased future water demand. 121
b. SFWMD Regional Water Availability Rule
A recent example of a "sustainable" policy decision in the context of
Consumptive Use Permit decisions is the adoption by the South Florida Wa-
ter Management District of a "Regional Water Availability Rule" (RWA) in
April 2007. Based on a determination that it was not in the public interest to
allow the ecological impacts of additional water withdrawals from the Ever-
glades and the Biscayne Aquifer, the South Florida Water Management Dis-
trict adopted the RWA rule, capping withdrawals from the Biscayne Aquifer,
the Lower East Coast's primary drinking water source. 122 This cap requires
the development of alternative water supplies to accommodate growth in
water supply beyond 2006 levels. 23
c. Minimum Flows and Levels
The statutory requirement for the establishment of "minimum flows and
levels" for surface and ground waters in the state to prevent significant harm
resulting from additional withdrawals 24 seems clearly aimed at preventing
consumptive use demands that are unsustainable for the natural system. Wa-
ter management districts are required by the Florida Water Resources Act of
1972 to establish minimum flows and levels for surface waters and aquifers
within their respective jurisdictions.1 25 Section 373.042(1) states that:
Within each section, or the water management district as a whole,
the department or the governing board shall establish the follow-
ing:
(a) Minimum flow for all surface watercourses in the area. The
minimum flow for a given watercourse shall be the limit at which
further withdrawals would be significantly harmful to the water
resources or ecology of the area.
121. !d.at779.
122. BASIS OF REVIEW FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES PERMIT APPLICATIONS § 3.2.1
(2010).
123. Now codified in THE DISTRICT'S BASIS OF REVIEW SECTION 3.2.1 [RESTRICTED
ALLOCATION ARaAS]; Id. § 3.2.1E(3).
124. FLA. STAT. § 373.042 (2010).
125. Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, ch. 72-299, part 1, § 2(3), 1972 Fla. Laws
1082, 1084 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 373.042 (2010)).
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(b) Minimum water level. The minimum water level shall be the
level of groundwater in an aquifer and the level of surface water at
which further withdrawals would be significantly harmful to the
water resources of the area.126
Each water management district is required to adopt a priority list of
waters for the adoption of MFLs, and must address MFLs in their regional
water supply plans for any area where water sources are not sufficient over a
twenty year period "to supply water for all existing and projected reasonably
anticipated future needs and to sustain the water resources and related natural
systems."'' 2 7 These plans must include prevention or recovery strategies if
water levels are currently below MFLs or are projected to fall below MFLs
within twenty years.
1 28
Minimum flows and levels provide a tool for planning and al-
location of water resources by specifying the extent and limits of
the availability of the State's surface and ground water. Minimum
flows and levels are just a part of a comprehensive water resources
management approach geared toward assuring the sustainability of
the water resources. They must be considered in conjunction with
all other resource protection responsibilities granted to the water
management districts by law, including consumptive use permit-
ting, water shortage management, and water reservations. 1
29
D. Federal Clean Water Act-Water Quality Standards and Section 404
Permits
1. Water Quality Standards
The Clean Water Act (CWA) 30 is designed "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."' 31 It sets
a national goal, "wherever attainable," to achieve "water quality which pro-
vides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
126. FLA. STAT. § 373.042(1) (emphasis added).
127. Id. § 373.036(2)(b)(4)(b).
128. Id. § 373.0421(2).
129. John J. Fumero, Florida Water Law and Environmental Water Supply for Everglades
Restoration, 18 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 379, 384 (2003). For a more in depth discussion of
water reservations, minimum flows and levels, and other aspects of Florida's Consumptive
Use Permitting program, see Christine A. Klein et al., supra note 11, at 445-46.
130. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
131. Id. § 1251(a).
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provides for recreation in and on the water."' 132 "[Tihe House Report on the
legislation states that '[tihe word 'integrity' as used is intended to convey a
concept that refers to a condition in which the natural structure and function
of ecosystems is maintained.' 133
The CWA requires states to establish water quality standards for all of
their waterbodies.' 34 A water quality standard consists of "the designated
uses of the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for such
waters based upon such uses."'135 The term "designated use" is defined by
EPA's implementing regulations as "those uses specified in water quality
standards for each water body or segment whether or not they are being at-
tained." 136 The term "criteria" is defined as: "[E]lements of State water
quality standards, expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or narrative
statements, representing a quality of water that supports a particular use.'
137
In order to be approved under the CWA, state water quality standards
must include: (1) the designated uses for each body of water; (2) what me-
thods were used and analyses conducted to support the revisions to state wa-
ter quality standards; (3) water quality criteria, which constitutes specific
limits on pollutants that protect the designated uses for each water body and
which may be expressed as either a narrative standard or a numeric concen-
tration level; and (4) an anti-degradation policy to protect existing uses of
bodies of water and high-quality water. 38 A state may only implement a
water quality standard that creates a standard that is as stringent, or more
protective, than the federal guidelines. 3 9 EPA's duty under the Act "is to
ensure that the underlying criteria, which are used as the basis of a particular
state's water quality standard, are scientifically defensible and are protective
of designated uses." 4
Under EPA regulations, a state's water quality standards must include
an antidegradation policy to ensure that "[e]xisting instream water uses and
132. Id. § 1251 (a)(2).
133. Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leaviti, 488 F.3d 904, 921 (11 th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
134. Id. § 1313(a)-(c).
135. Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
136. 40 C.F.R. §131.3(f).
137. Id. § 131.3(b).
138. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2); Water Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.3, 131.6, 131.12
(2009).
139. Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1300 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[S]tates may
not set standards that are less stringent than the CWAs.").
140. Natural Res, Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 16 F.3d 1395, 1402 (4th
Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
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the level of water quality necessary to protect the existing uses shall be main-
tained and protected.'
' 4
'
2. Total Maximum Daily Load Requirements (TMDLs)
The CWA requires states to develop Total Maximum Daily Loads for
all surface waters within their boundaries that do not meet specified water
quality standards, and prohibits the issuance of permits that would cause or
contribute to violations of water quality standards.1 42 This approach is in-
tended to keep pollution levels in impacted water bodies to sustainable le-
vels, but is not triggered until a waterbody is impaired.
43
3. Dredge and Fill Activities
Dredged or fill materials are pollutants under the CWA. 44 Section 404
of the CWA authorizes the Corps to issue permits to discharge or place
"dredged or fill materials" into waters of the United States, including wet-
lands, only at specified sites and under prescribed circumstances and condi-
tions. 45
Under the Act, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is required to give
wetlands the highest possible level of protection. 46 "[W]etlands constitute a
productive and valuable public resource, the unnecessary alteration and de-
struction of which should be discouraged as contrary to the public inter-
est."
147
The EPA's "guidelines" for the issuance of dredge and fill permits arti-
culate a presumption against allowing any damage to wetlands: "From a
national perspective, the degradation or destruction of. . . wetlands is consi-
dered to be among the most severe environmental impacts." 148 "The guiding
141. Water Quality Standards, 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2009); PUD No. I of Jefferson Cnty. v.
Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705 (1994).
142. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(D)(2) (2006); EPA Administered Permit Programs: The
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, 40 C.F.R. 122.4(d) (2010); Establishing
Limitations, Standards, & Other Permit Conditions, 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d) (2010); Water
Quality Planning & Management, 40 C.F.R. §130.7; Friends of Pinto Creek v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 504 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 2007).
143. See Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1025 (11 th Cir. 2002).
144. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) (amended by Clean Boating Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-288, § 3, 122 Stat. 2650, 2650).
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1344.
146. General Regulatory Policies, 33 C.F.R. § 320.1 (2010).
147. Id. § 320.4(b).
148. Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill
Material, 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(d) (2010).
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principle should be that degradation or destruction of [wetlands] may
represent an irreversible loss of valuable aquatic resources.'
' 49
The EPA guidelines provide that "dredged or fill material should not be
discharged into the aquatic ecosystem [wetlands], unless it can be demon-
strated that such a discharge will not have an unacceptable adverse impact
either individually or in combination with known and/or probable impacts of
other activities affecting the ecosystems of concern.' 150 The EPA guidelines
further provide that the Corps may not issue a dredge and fill permit "which
will cause or contribute to significant degradation of [wetlands]," and that
effects "contributing to significant degradation considered individually or
collectively, include.., loss of fish and wildlife habitat."'1
51
A permit may not be issued if: (i) there is a practicable alternative
which would have less adverse impact and does not have other significant
adverse environmental consequences; (ii) the "discharge will result in signif-
icant degradation;" (iii) the discharge does not include all appropriate and
practicable measures to minimize potential harm; or (iv) there does not exist
sufficient information to make a reasonable judgment as to whether the pro-
posed discharge will comply with the Corps' Guidelines for permit is-
suance. 52 A permit may not be issued "unless appropriate and practicable
steps have been taken which will minimize potential adverse impacts of the
discharge on the aquatic ecosystem."'
' 53
The EPA's guidelines also strictly prohibit the Corps from issuing any
permit "if there is a practicable alternative.., which would have less adverse
impact on the aquatic ecosystem. ' 54 The EPA Guidelines also provide for
"advanced identification" by the EPA Administrator of areas not suitable for
the disposal of fill due to "unacceptable adverse affects on . . . water sup-
plies, shellfish beds and fishery areas .... wildlife or recreational areas." 155
While commentators and observers have been critical of the implemen-
tation by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers of the Clean Water Act and its
implementing regulations, 56 the Act and rules clearly authorize and require
149. Id.
150. Id. § 230.1(c).
151. Id. § 230.10(c)(3).
152. Id. § 230.12(a)(3)(i-iv).
153. Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill
Material, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (2010).
154. Id. § 230.10(a).
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
156. The use of mitigation in Florida has resulted in substantial destruction of wildlife and
habitat and does not guarantee "no net loss" of wetlands. See Jason Totoiu, Building a Better
Stale Endangered Species Act: An Integrated Approach Toward Recovery, 40 ENVTL. L. REP.
10299, 10307 (2010).
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the USACOE to deny permits that would authorize impacts on waters or
associated wetlands of the United States that are not sustainable.157
E. Federal Endangered Species Act
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) was enacted in 1973 with the ex-
press purpose of "provid[ing] a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved"
through the development of a program to protect such endangered and
threatened species, and through the enforcement of various treaties and con-
ventions within the Act, which set forth national and international stan-
dards. 5 8 The overarching policy of the ESA is that "all Federal departments
and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened spe-
cies and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes [of the
ESA]."
The ESA "represent[s] the most comprehensive legislation for the pre-
servation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation."' 60 "[T]he lan-
guage, history, and structure of the [Endangered Species Act showed]
beyond doubt that Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the
highest of priorities.,,16' The Court observed that "[t]he plain intent of Con-
gress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost. ' 162 The ESA reflects "an explicit congression-
al decision to require agencies to afford first priority to the declared national
policy of saving endangered species" and "a conscious decision by Congress
to give endangered species priority over the 'primary missions' of federal
agencies."' 163 The "benefit of the doubt" should be given to an endangered
species when deciding what course of action will best conserve such spe-
cies."6
157. The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., is intended to "restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(emphasis added). The House of Representatives Report on the Act's initial adoption defined
"integrity" as "a condition in which the natural structure and function of ecosystems [are]
maintained." BLATNIK, FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS, H.R. REP.
No. 92-911, 76 (1972).
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006).
159. Id. § 1531(c)(1); Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781,
785 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)).
160. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
161. Id. at 174.
162. Id. at 184.
163. Id. at 185.
164. See id. at 174.
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Two key provisions of the ESA seek to prevent impacts on listed spe-
cies which go too far. Under the ESA, the Fish and Wildlife Service cannot
issue an incidental take permit (ITP) for private land use activities if they
will "appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
species in the wild."' 65
Next, section 1536(a)(2) commands each federal agency to "insure that
any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threat-
ened species."' 6 If the Fish and Wildlife Service finds a federal agency ac-
tion will jeopardize a listed species or adversely modify or destroy that spe-
cies' critical habitat, the Service must suggest those reasonable and prudent
alternatives which it believes would avoid jeopardy or adverse modification
of critical habitat. 67 "In response to an opinion finding 'jeopardy or adverse
modification,' the acting agency must comply with the substantive mandate
of section 7(a)(2) and either 'terminate the action, implement the proposed
alternative, or seek an exemption from the Cabinet-level Endangered Species
Committee pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e). '"1 68
The ESA requires government actions that promote sustainability. 69 In
Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish & Wildlife Services,70 the
Ninth Circuit invalidated a U.S. Forest Service regulation because, although
it protected species habitat necessary for "survival" of the spotted owl, it did
not provide the additional level of protection needed for "recovery" of the
species to the point where it would no longer be considered "endangered."''
In Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 7 2 the District Court stated that the purpose
of the ESA is to:
[P]romote populations that are self-sustaining without human in-
terference . . . . The protection of the ecosystems upon which en-
dangered and threatened species depend is explicitly recited as the
statute's purpose.... If the ESA did not require that species be re-
165. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2006).
166. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
167. Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
168. Fla. Key Deer v. Paulison, 522 F.3d 1133, 1139 (11 th Cir. 2008) (citing Nat'l Ass'n
of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2526 (2007)).
169. 16U.S.C.§ 1531(b).
170. 378 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2004), amended by 387 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2004).
171. See id. at 1069-70.
172. No. CV06-0483-JCC, 2007 WL 1795036 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2007).
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turned to a state in which they were naturally self-sustaining, pre-
servation of the habitat of the species would be unnecessary.'
73
The Habitat Conservation Planning process under the ESA is perhaps
the best example of a comprehensive regulatory approach to the sustainabili-
ty of ecosystems. A number of examples demonstrate how the HCP process,
when coordinated with the comprehensive land use planning authority of
local governments, can be an extremely effective tool for the preservation of
biodiversity and sustainability, consistent with the property rights of private
landowners. The best example may be the Sonoran Desert Conservation
Plan (Plan), an HCP that has been integrated into Pima County's comprehen-
sive land use plan. The Plan covers an expansive and biologically diverse
landscape of both public and private land, and prioritizes the biological re-
sources of the county, providing a guidepost for local government in both
short-term and long-term land use actions and decisions in the County.174 By
integrating natural resource protection and land use planning into one com-
prehensive plan, the Plan provides an innovative mechanism for the local
government to regulate the development and sustainability of the communi-
ty. 175
Unlike most HCPs that are created for the incidental take of a single
species, the Sonoran Desert Conservation Plan seeks to conserve biodiversi-
ty. 176 The Plan requires large areas of land to be dedicated to conservation-
including private land.177 Integrated HCPs, which affect private property
rights, raise Fifth Amendment regulatory takings issues.'78 However, a plan
that is based on science and community involvement, such as the Sonoran
Desert Conservation Plan, can avoid such issues. 7 9
173. Id.at*15.
174. Sonoran Desert Conservation Plan Home, PIMA.GOv, http://www.pima.gov/
CMO/SDCP/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
175. Sonoran Desert Conservation Plan Introduction, PIMA.GOV, http://www.pima.gov/
CMO/SDCP/intro.html (last visited Aug. 1,2011).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. Regulations that prohibit development of undeveloped land "carry with them a high
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
mitigating serious public harm." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992)
(permit denial for house construction on undeveloped coastal property based on beach setback
line regulation was treated as a physical taking).
179. Sonoran Desert Conservation Plan Introduction, supra note 174. For a discussion of
why the ultimate impact of the ESA on the conservation and recovery of species remains
uncertain, see Totoiu, supra note 14, at 10308-10.
[Vol. 35
28
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss3/4
REGULATING FOR SUSTAINABILITY
F. Land Use Planning
Sustainability principles are perhaps most comprehensive and effective-
ly enacted and implemented by government at the comprehensive land use
planning stage, where development expectations are created and agencies act
with the greatest amount of discretion. "'Land Use planning in essence
chooses particular uses for the land; environmental regulation, at its core,
does not mandate particular uses of the land, but requires only that, however
the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed lim-
its."" 8  Comprehensive planning decisions are legislative, subject to the
most deferential standards of judicial review.18' They will only be over-
turned if not fairly debatable, and will be upheld when any valid planning
rationale supports the decision. 8 2 Environmental permitting decisions, in
contrast, are made pursuant to established legislative criteria, and the denial
of permits for land which has previously been designated for such uses in
comprehensive plans and or zoning codes can create a heightened potential
for private property rights claims.
"[I1n the 1970s and 1980s, several states enacted statutes that provided
states with a significant role in land use planning."'' 83 "Under these growth
management laws, states require local land use plans to be consistent with
larger statewide or regional land use plans. Thirteen states have adopted
growth management laws. These states are: California, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington.' 84
"Land use planning and the evolving body of American land use law
originates from the notion that cities, towns, and regions must look at the
'big picture' to plan adequately for the future.' 85 "[M]any states ... require
municipalities to prepare so-called comprehensive, master, or general
plans."' 8
6
180. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
191 (2001) (Stevens J, dissenting) (quoting Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480
U.S. 572, 587 (1987)).
181. Martin Cnty v. Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288, 1295 (Fla. 1997).
182. Id.
183. Totoiu, supra note 14, at 10305 (citations omitted).
184. Id.
185. Jonathan Douglas Witten, Carrying Capacity and the Comprehensive Plan: Estab-
lishing and Defending Limits to Growth, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 583, 593 (2001).
186. Id. (citing Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., The Comprehensive Plan as Constitution: General
Lessons from Recent California Zoning Initiative Cases, in 1992 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW
HANDBOOK (Kenneth H. Young ed., 1992)); see generally DANIEL J. CURTIN, JR., CURTIN'S
CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW (Solano Press, 20th ed. 2000).
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City or town planning is a constitutional concept ... has in
view the physical development of the municipality 'to conserve
and promote the public health, safety, morals and general wel-
fare. ' 187 Municipal planning ... is the accommodation, through
unity in construction, of the variant interests seeking expression in
the local physical life to the interest of the community as a social
unit. Planning is a science and an art concerned with land eco-
nomics and land policies in terms of social and economic better-
ment. The control essential to planning is exercised through gov-
ernment ownership or regulation of the use of the locus. But the
governmental regulatory power has its limits.'8
1. Limited or Timed Growth and Carrying Capacity-Based Ordinances
Since the 1970s some local governments across the country have
adopted and implemented growth and development-limiting ordinances, typ-
ically to address concerns related to the loss or degradation of ecosystems or
farmland, the public and social costs of urban sprawl, and limitations on the
capacity of public facilities.189 Some were responding to patterns of "random
development" resulting from "unplanned growth," resulting in "unfettered
expansion," resulting in the "waste of valuable land resources."' 90 Legisla-
tion that enacts growth limits or caps come under constant scrutiny as lan-
downers argue that they are unconstitutional, on a variety of grounds.
One method for limiting growth to acceptable levels is to apply a carry-
ing capacity analysis.' 9' "A carrying capacity analysis assesses the ability of
a built resource (such as roadways, wastewater treatment plants, municipal
swimming pools) or natural resource (such as aquifers, surface water bodies,
or coastal estuaries) to absorb population growth and related physical devel-
opment without degradation.' 192 "Understanding the carrying capacity or
constraints of these resources can be an effective method for identifying the
areas of the community that are suitable for new or expanded develop-
ment."'193 By completing a carrying capacity analysis, the government, and
187. Grosso v. Bd. of Adjustment, 61 A.2d 167, 168 (N.J. 1948) (quoting Mansfield &
Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 198 A. 225, 229 (N.J. 1938)).
188. Id.
189. See generally Note, A Zoning Program for Phased Growth: Ramapo Township's
Time Controls on Residential Development, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 723 (1972).
190. 3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 16:58 (citing A Zoning Program for Phased Growth:
Ramapo Township's Time Controls on Residential Development, supra note 189, at 724).
191. See Witten, supra note 185, at 584-85.
192. See id. (citing DEVON SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE CARRYING CAPACITY CONCEPT AS A
PLANNING TOOL (Am. Planning Ass. 1978)).
193. Witten, supra note 185, at 586.
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local governments in particular, gain a powerful and legally defensible tool
with which to make decisions,' 94 and this analysis may also help local gov-
ernments to resolve conflicts between competing development and preserva-
tion goals. 95 One excellent example of environmental regulation based upon
the "carrying capacity" of natural resources is the Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact and implementing ordinances, jointly administered by the States of
California and Nevada, five counties, several municipalities, and the United
States Forest Service. The Compact has developed regional "environmental
threshold carrying capacities," or "thresholds"-environmental standards
"necessary to maintain a significant scenic, recreational, educational, scien-
tific, or natural value of the region or to maintain public health and safety
within the region" and "'shall include but not be limited to standards for air
quality, water quality, soil conservation, vegetation preservation, and
noise.' ' 196 The Compact is to regulate development in the region in order to
achieve these thresholds "while providing opportunities for orderly growth
and development consistent with such capacities."' 97
One of the earliest and leading cases on the subject of limited growth
ordinances is Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Peta-
luma,'98 which reviewed the City of Petaluma's strict cap on growth, which
had been enacted as a response to its rapid development and expansion in the
1970s.' 99 The ordinance limited yearly development to 500 housing units,
but exempted projects of four units or less, and was limited to a five-year
period.2°° Developers and landowners challenged the ordinance as an arbi-
trary and unreasonable action that was exclusionary, and lacked a legitimate
governmental interest. 20' Important to its ultimate validity, the quota was
based on a careful study which substantiated the city's restrictions.202 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the ordinance because "the concept of the public wel-
fare is sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma's desire to preserve its small
town character, its open spaces and low density of population, and to grow at
an orderly and deliberate pace. 20 3
194. ZYGMUNTJ.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND
SOCIETY 20-21 (1998).
195. Id.
196. League to Save Lake Tahoe and Sierra Club v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 739 F.
Supp. 2d 1260, 1265 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
197. Id.
198. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
199. Id. at 900.
200. Id. at 901.
201. Id. at 905-06.
202. See id. at 900.
203. Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma Cnty., 522 F.2d at 908-09.
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In reaching these conclusions, the court was persuaded by two previous
cases in which both it2°4 and the Supreme Court of the United States205 had
upheld municipal ordinances that, as a result of prohibitions on land uses
other than single-family homes, "had the purpose and effect of permanently
restricting growth." 2°6
In another case, the Supreme Court of Nevada upheld, against state law
claims of inconsistency with the state's planning law, a citizen-initiated
county ordinance which limited the number of new dwelling units in the
county to 280 per year.207 The Court rejected a substantive due process claim
because the 2% annual growth rate limit was based on a master plan and
"reflects County residents' desire to protect and conserve their natural re-
sources." 20 8 The Court ruled that:
As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he police
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and un-
healthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." Protection
of a community's character is substantially related to legiti-
mate state interests.2°
2. Limited Growth Ordinances in Florida
Limited Growth Ordinances have been upheld by Florida courts. In
City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc.,21° the city had adopted an annual cap
on density based on its concerns for water and sewage capacities, fire and
police protection, hurricane evacuation, ecological and environmental protec-
tion, aesthetics, and public access to the ocean.2t' Under the cap, the specific
number of permits to be issued each year was based specifically and solely
on the calculations concerning traffic capacity, due to the fact that there was
204. Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 252 (9th Cir. 1974).
205. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
206. Constr. Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma Cnty., 522 F.2d at 907.
207. Sustainable Growth Initiative Comm. v. Jumpers, LLC, 128 P.3d 452, 456 (Nev.
2006).
208. Id at 38. Every line drawn by a legislature leaves some out that might well have been
included. We cannot say that just because the 280-unit per annum cap leaves some out that
might have been included, the 280-unit figure is arbitrary and capricious." Id. (citing Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1,6, 9, (1974).
209. Sustainable Growth Initiative Comm., 128 P.3d at 466.
210. 432 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
211. Id. at 1334-35.
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no existing method that would yield a specific number to represent the limi-
tations that existed relative to the other factors. 1 2 Upon challenge, the court
upheld the density cap even though it found that the traffic study upon which
the overall density cap was based was flawed.1 3 The court found that the
number of permits chosen by the City to be allocated was a reasonable ap-
proximation of its actual, but un-quantified growth limits, including aesthet-
ics, and thus the growth cap, even given the flawed traffic numbers, was not
unreasonable or arbitrary.214 In addition, the court gave great weight to the
fact that the City Commission had held countless hearings and meetings on
the issue before adopting the ordinance. 25 Based on the reports, public
meetings, studies, and comprehensive plans, the cap was ruled to be a valid
"exercise of police power, which contributed substantially to the public
health, morals, safety, and welfare of [its] citizens" and therefore was not
arbitrary.1 6
In contrast, where the City of Boca Raton established a cap on permits
by referendum, which was not based on any analysis or even consultation
with the City Planning Department, it was invalidated by the court.2' 7 There
was no evidence presented by the City that public facilities and infrastructure
were insufficient to handle the impacts of future growth. 218 The court found
that no substantial competent evidence existed to support a finding that the
cap was rationally related to valid municipal purposes of "public health,
morals, safety, and welfare. ' '219 Thus, the cap was arbitrary and unreasona-
ble. 2
20
The "sustainability" arguments raised by the City and rejected by the court
in City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp.,221 can be instructive. The City
had argued that its population should be limited by the budget of rain-water
falling within city limits. 222 The court found this theory valid as a matter of
regional planning, but rejected it as a rational basis for a growth limit in an
individual municipality when several governmental agencies were responsi-
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1334.
214. Id. at 1334-35.
215. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d at 1335.
216. Id. at 1336.
217. City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 155, 159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1979) (per curiam).
218. See generally id.
219. Id. at 157.
220. Id.
221- 371 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (per curiam).
222. Id. at 156.
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ble for providing sufficient water from other sources and were presently
doing so.113 The court explained that:
Water resources will not depend upon a 'budget' which Boca Ra-
ton or other cities may impose, but rather will depend upon hard
social choices involving agricultural priorities, environmental de-
mands, quantity of water used in various sectors, and the cost
which society is willing to pay .... A [c]ap predicated upon pre-
servation of water resources is a preliminary and unnecessarily
224drastic solution to an area-water resource issue.
Concerns for air quality and noise levels were raised by the City but al-
so rejected by the court, because the City's noise and air pollution levels
were "normal for a community of [Boca Raton's] size and are well within
state and federal standards and regulations. '225 The court found it "unneces-
sary," and insupportable for the City to enact growth caps based on a desire
to have noise and air pollution levels that were superior to averages across
the country.226
On each of these issues, the court's rejection of the ordinance and its
underlying justifications appears to have stemmed from its determination that
the greater the limitation on the use of property, the more specific-as op-
posed to conceptual or abstract-the supporting scientific, technical, or plan-
ning case needed to be to support the measure.227
The appellate court was clearly troubled by an ordinance that
limited growth before the city's facilities and resources were fully
maximized. And, despite twenty-one volumes of testimony taken
at trial, the court felt that Boca Raton depended upon justifications
that were "largely presented in [the] abstract and without [a] spe-
cific factual showing of real necessity.
228
The court's analysis has been criticized as a "simplistic" one, inappro-
priately applied to a "complex problem. 229 Surely, it can be seen as an ex-
ample of how the judicial system in general can be ill-equipped to resolve
complex scientific or technical disputes, and valid to surmise that the court
223. id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d at 158.
227. See id. at 159.
228. Pierce, supra note 7, at 114 (quoting City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371
So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (per curiam)).
229. Id. at 114.
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over-stepped its judicial role in second-guessing the technical and scientific
support for the City's ordinance.2 30 But it is also reasonable to read this case
as simply the result of a court's determination that there is a sliding scale of
support needed to support regulations and in that, on these facts, the City had
not shown even the basic rational basis for its specific growth caps. In
another situation, with more scientific and technical support for a determina-
tion that continued population growth in a certain community, at least cumu-
latively, had an important adverse impact on regional water supplies, the
outcome may well be different. For example, the current water shortage
situation in south Florida, with limitations on the regional water supply and
municipalities being limited in the amount of water the state will permit them
to withdraw from the Biscayne (surficial) Aquifer, which connects to the
Everglades, such scenarios are real, and not conceptual. For example, as
noted by Pierce, "conserving water would prove important to the public
health and safety if the city's own aquifer became contaminated in the fu-
ture."23 '
Another case that invalidated a land use density cap was Innkeepers
Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of New Smyrna Beach,232 where the Fifth District
found a "flat density cap" enacted by a citizens' referendum, supported by no
study or methodology, and allowing of no variances, to be arbitrary and
invalid.233 The density cap limited multifamily dwellings to twelve dwelling
units per acre and hotels/motels to twenty-four dwelling units per acre, which
figures, said the Court "apparently materialized 'out of the air."' 234 The den-
sity caps applied to the entire city, without regard to any specific planning
considerations in any particular regions of the city.23 They were invalidated,
not because they were too strict, but because they were arbitrarily adopted.236
3. Florida's Community Planning Act
Florida's modern comprehensive planning law, adopted in 1985, re-
quires each local government to adopt and maintain a comprehensive plan
that meets identified standards in state law and which governs all subsequent
zoning and development decisions subsequently taken by the local govern-
230. Id. at 117.
231. Id. at 114.
232. 460 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
233. Id. at 380.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. For a discussion of various judicial responses to "no growth" ordinances in gen-
eral, see generally Pierce, supra note 7.
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ment.237 The Act is controversial and constantly the subject of legislative
proposals to reduce state oversight of local planning decisions and/ or make
the applicable standards more flexible. In general, the Act authorizes and
requires local governments to plan for projected growth, ensures the ade-
quate provision of necessary infrastructure and services, and protects envi-
ronmental resources. 238 The Act's provisions related to the role of population
and growth projections vis a vis timing of allowable development are de-
bated and controversial. Its provisions concerning the provision of or pay-
ment for necessary infrastructure by developers, and its provisions concern-
ing the factors used to determine the appropriate amount, location and types
of development are important legislative requirements for the financial and
ecological sustainability of land use plans.
a. Future Land Use Plan Requirements
Under the Florida Act, how many people are expected to live and use
land in a community is a key issue. Where, and how, they will live and use
land are separate questions. At least until the 2011 Legislative session, the
law gives the government the ability to not accommodate the full projected
population if doing so would have unacceptable impacts on other required
planning factors.239 In 2011, the Legislature made a policy determination to
require, with an exception for Areas of Critical State Concern under section
380.05 that the "amount of land designated for future land uses should allow
the operation of real estate markets to provide adequate choices for perma-
nent and seasonal residents and business and may not be limited solely by the
projected population. The element shall accommodate at least the minimum
amount of land required to accommodate the medium projections of the
[state] for at least a 10-year planning period . ... "240
The Act requires that, whatever amount of the projected population is
accommodated by the plan, basic land use decisions about the type and in-
tensity or density of development to be allowed are determined by a variety
of factors, including, among other things, the character of undeveloped land,
the availability of water supplies, public facilities, and services, and the dis-
couragement of urban sprawl. 241 Comprehensive Plans must include a con-
servation element for the "conservation, use, and protection of natural re-
237. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3167, 163.3177, 163.3194 (2011).
238' Id. § 163.3161(4).
239. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a) (2011).
240. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)4.
241. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)2.
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sources.... including factors that affect energy conservation.242 A Conserva-
tion Element must protect air and water quality, water quantity, minerals,
soils, and native vegetation, fisheries, wildlife, wildlife habitat, and marine
habitat, and direct incompatible future land uses away from wetlands.243
Coastal local governments must include a Coastal Management Ele-
ment which "[m]aintain[s], restore[s], and enhance[s] the overall quality of
the coastal zone environment", "use[s] ecological planning principles and
assumptions in the determination of the suitability of permitted develop-
ment", "[l]imit[s] public expenditures that subsidize development in coastal
high-hazard areas", and "[p]rotect[s] human life against the effects of natural
disasters".2 4
G. The Florida Keys Example
Florida's land use planning laws, when applied in the early 1990s to the
local governments making up the Florida Keys, resulted in comprehensive
land use plans for Monroe County and its cities which imposed annual and
overall caps on new development approvals that are well below population
projections. A 1995 Order of the Administration Commission (Florida's
Governor and Cabinet) required and approved the "carrying capacity"-
based Monroe County Plan and found that comprehensive plans are not re-
quired to accommodate projected population regardless of the impacts to
other planning issues, and must be based on a full analysis of all growth limi-
tations.245
Originally, those growth caps were the result of hurricane evacuation
constraints, but in recent years, the growth rate was reduced in response to
ecosystem protection concerns.
This Order resulted from the application of the Act to Monroe County
(the Florida Keys) in the early 1990s. The original adopted plan adopted by
the county was greatly deficient and was disapproved by the state. The
County agreed to completely re-write the plan, based upon an overall "carry-
ing capacity" approach. The amended plan was still deficient, and a second
legal challenge resulted in dramatic findings by a state administrative law
judge that the carrying capacity of the Keys' near shore waters to assimilate
additional nutrient (wastewater and storm water) pollution had been ex-
ceeded. The Order ruled that the amount of development allowed in the ini-
242. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(d)1 (2011).
243. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(d)2.
244. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(g)1, 5-7.
245. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Monroe Cnty., 95 E.R F.A.L.R. 148 (Admin. Comm. Dec.
12, 1996 (Final Order and Order of Partial Remand).
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tial Plan was "excessive because of the inability ... to evacuate people in the
event of a Category 3, 4, 5 hurricane and because the ability of the near shore
waters and sea grasses to sustain development had been exceeded. 246
The plan was again invalidated and the next re-write limited annual and
overall new permitting to that which could meet a "no net nutrient increase"
pollution standard, and be accommodated within a 24-hour evacuation time.
Because the health of the marine and terrestrial systems were also known
limitations on development-but not as easily quantified as hurricane evacu-
ation times-the amendments also conditioned each year's permit allocations
on "substantial progress" on tasks in an annual Work Program, making such
progress a condition precedent to maintaining the existing growth rate.247
The Order discussed how these provisions were required in order to bring the
plan into compliance with the Act. 8
The approved plan changes required that each year, the Commission
"shall determine ... whether substantial progress has been achieved toward
accomplishing the tasks of the work program."249 If "substantial progress has
not been made, the unit cap for new residential development shall be reduced
by at least 20 percent for the following year.
250
The Commission found a lack of "substantial progress" in 1999 and re-
duced the annual permit allocation by 20 percent and extended the five-year
Work Program to seven years.25' Key among the Work Program require-
ments was that an overall carrying capacity study be performed and that the
land use plan be amended by 2003 to implement the findings of that study.
252
The specific legal requirement for the study was as follows:
246. Abbott et al. v. Admin. Comm., 1997 WL 1052490, at *25 (DOAH Final Order
1997); Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Monroe Cnty., Admin. Comm. Case No. ACC95-024,
DOAH Case No. 91-1932GM (Final Order Dec. 12, 1995); Monroe Cnty. Chowder & March-
ing Society, Inc. v. Dep't. of Comm. Affairs, DOAH Case No. 93-4326RGM (Final Order
July 17, 1995); Monroe Cnty. Chowder & Marching Society, Inc. v. Admin. Comm., DOAH
Case No. 93-6028RGM (Final Order Aug. 7, 1995).
247. Abbot et al. v. Admin. Comm., 1997 WL 1052490 at 33-35 (DOAH Final Order
1997).
248. Id. at *10. Remedial amendments are required to bring a plan into compliance with
Chapter 163.
249. FLA. STAT. § 380.0552(4)(a) (2007) (amended 2010).
250. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 28-20.110 (2010). The 1997 Final Order interpreted this
provision: "The number of permits authorized [annually] is . . .conditional." Abbot, 1997
WL 1052490, at *26. "If the ... Commission determines that 'substantial progress' has not
been achieved, [it] is required to reduce the number of authorized residential permits ... by a
minimum of 20 [percent]." Id. (emphasis added). "Continued development.., is conditioned
upon 'substantial progress' being made in completing the Work Program." Id. at *33.
251. Id. at 35.
252. Id. at 37.
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The carrying capacity analysis shall be designed to determine the
ability of the Florida Keys Ecosystems, and the various segments
thereof to withstand all impacts of additional land development
activities .... The carrying capacity analysis shall consider aes-
thetic, socioeconomic (including sustainable tourism), quality of
life and community character issues, including the concentration of
population, the amount of open space, diversity of habitats, and
species richness. The analysis shall reflect the interconnected na-
ture of the Florida Keys' natural systems, but may consider and
analyze the carrying capacity of specific islands or groups of isl-
ands and specific habitats, including distinct parts of the Keys' ma-
rine system.
3
Upon completion of the study, Monroe County was, by July 2003, to:
Implement the carrying capacity study by, among other things, the
adoption of all necessary plan amendments to establish a rate of
growth and a set of development standards that ensure that any and
all new development does not exceed the capacity of the county's
environment and marine system to accommodate additional im-
pacts. Plan amendments will include a review of the County's Fu-
ture Land Use Map series and changes to the map series and the
"as of right" and "maximum" densities authorized for the plan's
future land use categories based upon the natural character of the
land and natural resources that would be impacted by the currently
authorized land uses, densities and intensities.
2 5 4
The Study was completed in late 2002. Among its chief findings were:
'Development in the Florida Keys has surpassed the carrying ca-
pacity of upland habitats to maintain [further development].'
'Secondary and indirect impacts of development further contribute
to habitat loss and fragmentation" and that "any further develop-
ment in the Florida Keys would exacerbate secondary and indirect
impacts to remaining habitat.'
253. Id.
254. RULE 28-20 WORK GRP., DEP'T OF CMTY. AFFAIRS, FINAL REPORT OF THE FLORIDA
KEYS CARRYING CAPACITY STUDY IMPLEMENTATION 9 (Sept. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.dca.state.fl.us/fdcp/dcp/acscfFiles/FinalReportRule28-20.pdf.
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'Any further encroachment into areas dominated by native vegeta-
tion would exacerbate habitat loss and fragmentation.'
255
'Development in the Florida Keys has surpassed the carrying ca-
pacity of [several protected species] to maintain [the effects of fur-
ther development activities].'
'[T]he Lower Keys marsh rabbit [and silver rice rat are highly re-
stricted and likely could not withstand further habitat loss without
facing extinction. It makes a similar finding relative to the Key
Deer, and finds that any further habitat loss would place the Stock
Island tree snail in jeopardy].'256
H. Property Rights Implications of the Monroe County Rate of Growth
Ordinance
Monroe County's annual growth caps were upheld against a property
rights challenge in Burnham v. Monroe County.2 5 7 Upholding a summary
judgment order granted in favor of the County, Florida's Third District
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance, holding: (1) The county did not
affect a taking by denying the owners' request for building permit based on
their failure to incorporate design features that ordinance sought to encour-
age, and (2) The rate of growth ordinance was constitutional.2 58 The court
ruled that the "trial court correctly determined that the ROGO ordinance was
constitutional, as it substantially advances the legitimate state interests of
promoting water conservation, windstorm protection, energy efficiency,
growth control, and habitat protection.,
259
There are two key features of the County's ordinance that likely play an
important role in avoiding property rights violations. First, no properties are
255. Id. at 6-12.
256. See Grosso, supra note 33.
As of this writing, the County and the State remain in the process of implementing the Carry-
ing Capacity Study and the rest of the Comprehensive Plan. While the details of the remain-
ing issues and debates are beyond the scope of this article, the key point is that the compre-
hensive plans adopted in the Keys, an Area of Critical State Concern, limited the total amount
of, and strictly regulated the standards for, future development.
Id.
257. 738 So. 2d 471, 472 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam).
258. Id.
259. Id.
[Vol. 35
40
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss3/4
REGULATING FOR S US TA INABILITY
facially precluded from receiving a permit allocation. 260 Instead, allocations
are based on a competitive scoring system under which the highest scoring
applications (based on a suite of planning considerations related to ecological
impacts, infrastructure availability, surrounding development, etc.), and thus,
all properties have the potential to receive an award.26 ' The Burnham opi-
nion stressed that the landowner had not availed himself of the opportunity to
increase the competitiveness of his application by incorporating available
design features.262 Next, the ordinance grants applicants who have been de-
nied an allocation for four years the right to either receive a permit allocation
or have their land acquired by the County.263
1. The Applicability of the Florida Keys Precedent to Other Communities
A subsequent case under Florida's Growth Management Act, and in-
volving Palm Beach County, interpreted the Monroe County Orders, making
the following observations:
According to expert planning testimony for DCA and the County,
the County is obligated to plan for growth in accordance with [the
statute and rule] up to its "sustainable carrying capacity," which
has not been reached. Whether or not they believe the County has
the option to plan to slow or stop growth before reaching "sustain-
able carrying capacity," it is clear from the evidence that the Coun-
ty is not doing so, but instead is planning for continued growth
within the framework of its Plan until reaching what it considers to
be "build-out" conditions.
The Monroe County orders recognize that the [statute and adminis-
trative rule] require a sustainable carrying capacity analysis in ap-
propriate situations. The experts cited in paragraph 63 testified
that Palm Beach County is not yet facing such a situation.
In any event, the [Act] accords a local government the flexibility
to make a variety of planning decisions regarding how its jurisdic-
tion should grow. Section 163.3177(6)(a), Florida Statutes, re-
cognizes that the future land use plan should be based on a num-
ber of factors, including not just population projections, but also
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. Burnham, 738 So. 2d at 472.
263. See id.; MONROE COUNTY, FLA., RATE OF GROWTH ORDINANCE 16-1992 (June 23,
1992).
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the character of undeveloped land, availability of public services
and other planning objectives.
264
The outcome in the Keys springs from the compelling nature of the
planning facts-the "surveys, studies and data" under Chapter 163-in the
Keys.265 The extreme ecological and infrastructure limits on growth in the
unique and fragile Florida Keys-as evidenced by their status as an Area of
Critical State Concern under Chapter 380 of the Florida Statutes were the
dominant factor in this outcome.264 Yet the basic legal principle would apply
anywhere in Florida. To the extent that the data and analysis reveals signifi-
cant natural or other constraints on development and land use impacts in
other local governments, a similar outcome-in the context typically of ei-
ther comprehensive plan updates or the denial of applications for Future
Land Use Map or policy amendments-is possible in other jurisdictions.
While the Act was amended in 2011 to require comprehensive plans in the
most of the state (those areas not designated as Areas of Critical State Con-
cern) to accommodate the minimum population projections for at least a 10-
year planning period,267 the balance of the Acts, provisions, many of which
are describe above, allow and require that population to be accommodated in
a sustainable manner. A 2003 letter from the Department of Community
Affairs (DCA) regarding Palm Beach County's population forecasts stated:
Local governments are not required to convert agricultural lands
based solely on population trends without consideration for other
planning objectives and needs.
[Liocal governments are not compelled to authorize unlimited or
unchecked urbanization simply to accommodate past growth
trends resulting from rapid urbanization. 268
In the clearest example of this principle, the comprehensive plans of
Monroe County and its cities impose annual caps on new development ap-
provals that are well below population projections.
264. 1000 Friends of Fla., Inc. v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 5 E.R. F.A.L.R. 91, (May 9,
2005) (DOAH Case No. 04-4492GM; Final Order DCA05-GM-082) (emphasis added).
265. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)2 (2010).
266. See FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (2010).
267. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)4 (2011).
268. Letter from Charles Gauthier, Chief, Office of Comprehensive Planning, to Lorenzo
Aghemo, Planning Dir., Palm Beach Cnty. 3-4 (July 28, 2003), available at
http://www.evergladeslaw.org/pdf/attachment-gm3.pdf.
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In the Keys, the limits are the ability of its fabled marine system to han-
dle more nutrient pollution, its limited evacuation capacity (obviously a
compelling public safety issue) and the minimum spatial needs of several
endangered and other listed species. On mainland south Florida, there is a
minimum spatial extent of land needed to restore the Everglades and main-
tain a water supply. In other places the issue may be the necessary critical
mass of farmland to sustain an agricultural economy, the critical spatial
mass, quality or function of ecosystems and natural features, or agricultural
industries, the maximum allowable pollution loads in rivers, lakes or springs,
minimum flows and levels for water bodies, or habitat needs similar to those
in south Florida. Development can also be limited as a result of the inability
to provide critical public facilities or services such as evacuation capacity,
269
safe, efficient transportation, wastewater, potable water, flood protection,
solid waste, or other necessities. As Florida continues to grow, and forests,
swamps, watersheds, wildlife habitats, water bodies, and other natural fea-
tures grow more degraded or fragmented, as farming acreage falls below the
critical mass needed to support long-term investment, and as expansion of
key public facilities becomes increasingly constrained or precluded, such
circumstances are likely to appear farther up the state.
J. Adequate Public Facilities Requirements
Florida is among the states that statutorily require development be
served with "adequate" public facilities. Florida's "concurrency" law re-
quires all local governments to adopt minimum level of service standards,
consistent with state law, for solid waste, storm water, and wastewater, , and
precludes the approval of a development that will cause a "concurrency stan-
dard" to fail to be met.27 Local governments are authorized to make trans-
portation, parks and recreation, schools and other public facilities the subject
of concurrency requirements.27'
The Act requires that the future land uses allowed in local government
comprehensive plan be based upon, among other things, the "availability of
269. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 163.3178(2)(d) (2011) (requiring a comprehensive plan's
coastal management element to include "principles for hazard mitigation and protection of
human life against the effects of natural disaster, including population evacuation, which take
into consideration the capability to safely evacuate the density of coastal population proposed
in the future land use plan element in the event of an impending natural disaster.").
270. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3180(1) and (2).
271. Id.
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water supply.".27 2 This requirement is key to coordinating land and water
planning.
Finally, the Act includes provisions that promote fiscally efficient
development. One of the factors to be considered when determining if a land
use change would inappropriately promote urban sprawl is whether it
"[a]llows for land use patterns or timing which disproportionately increase
the cost in time, money, and energy of providing and maintaining facilities
and services, including roads, potable water, sanitary sewer, stormwater
management, law enforcement, education, health care, fire and emergency
273
response, and general government.
The Act requires the Capital Improvements Element of comprehensive
plans to "[1]imit public expenditures that subsidize development in high
hazard coastal areas. 274 Section 163.3178(1), concerning coastal manage-
ment, declares "the intent of the Legislature that local government compre-
hensive plans restrict development activities where such activities would
damage or destroy coastal resources, and that such plans protect human life
and limit public expenditures in areas that are subject to destruction by natu-
ral disaster.,
275
III. STRICT PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIONS, GROWTH CAPS,
EXACTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION
A. Private Property and the Takings Clause
Growth controls are potentially subject to claims that they deprive own-
ers of their property without just compensation.276 Land use or environmen-
tal regulations which "go too far" and require a private landowner to bear a
burden that should be bome by the public are a taking of private property. 77
A regulatory taking occurs when the legislation (1) does not advance a legi-
timate governmental interest or (2) denies the landowner all or virtually all
economically viable use of his or her land.278
272. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)2.d (2011).
273. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (6)(a) 9.a.(VILI)
274. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (6)(g)6.
275. FLA. STAT. § 163.3178(1) (2011).
276. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause states: "[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
277. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
278. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978); Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monte-
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The most stringent land use and environmental regulations-those
which facially preclude or severely limit development or intensive uses of
land, and those which, as applied, allow a landowner little or no such uses-
face heightened property rights limitations:
[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without economically
beneficial or productive options for its use-typically . . . by re-
quiring land to be left substantially in its natural state-carry with
them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious
public harm.
2 79
A landowner who "has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, has suffered a taking.280
B. The Right to Travel
In addition to the private property rights implications, the so-called,
"right to travel" is arguably implicated by limited or no growth ordinances.281
The Privilege and Immunities Clause of the Constitution states: "The citi-
zens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states. 282 One of the Privileges recognized is the right to tra-
vel, held to be the "right of free ingress into other States, and egress from
them. 283 This clause protects the right to travel from state infringement.
2 4
The right to travel includes the right of foreign residents to be treated the
same as native-born residents,285 so as to preclude unequal licensing fees. A
rey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1430 (9th Cir. 1996); Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066,
1072 (11 th Cir. 1996).
279. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992).
280. Id. at 1019. Florida's statutory Property Rights Act establishes a standard for lan-
downer compensation that is intended to provide relief to landowners in a greater number of
cases that would be under the Constitution, but has not been interpreted by commentators and
cases as setting the standard for compensation significantly lower than the Constitutional line.
See Richard Grosso & Robert Hartsell, Old McDonald Still Has a Farm: Agricultural Prop-
erty Rights After the Veto of S.B. 1712, FLA. B.J. Mar. 2005, at 41, 43; see also Holmes v.
Marion Cnty., 960 So. 2d 828, 829-30 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Citrus Cnty. v. Halls
River Dev., Inc., 8 So. 3d 413, 415 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
281. See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 378 (1978).
282. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
283. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
284. United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920).
285. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 390.
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state could not set a cap on growth which would prohibit non-residents from
purchasing land or moving to the state.286
Even if a Comprehensive Plan only allows enough growth for town res-
idents, it does not violate the right to travel so long as out-of-town residents
are not banned.287 In York, a District Court judge upheld a growth cap:
which does not on its face ban or direct reduction in sale or lease
of new housing to non-residents and does not impact sale or lease
of existing housing, is sharply distinguishable from legislation that
has been held to impose a penalty, such as durational residency re-
quirements that flatly deny eligibility for vital benefits or reduce
the quantum of benefits available until a person has resided in a
state for a certain period of time.... Even granting that such an
ordinance discourages migration, it does not penalize it in a consti-
tutional sense .... [The Court is] 'unable to find that a zoning or-
dinance creates a barrier to interstate migration merely by limiting
options and increasing costs for persons wishing to reside in a par-
ticular locality."'
288
In Construction Industry Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petalu-
ma,289 the Ninth Circuit upheld the City of Petaluma's strict cap on growth
against a right to travel argument, because "the concept of the public welfare
is sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma's desire to preserve its small town
character, its open spaces and low density of population, and to grow at an
orderly and deliberate pace. ' ' 2 " The court noted that all land use regulation
can have potential exclusionary tendencies and impacts on citizens of sur-
rounding communities, but should be upheld so long as they bear a rational
relationship to a legitimate state interest.
291
C. Adequate Public Facility and Other Moratoria
Ordinances that limit development approvals based on the availability
of public services and facilities, or based on appropriately supported annual
286. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59, 759 n.16 (1966).
287. York v. Town of Limington, Maine, Civil No. 03-99-P-H, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 686
at *23 (D. Me. 2004).
288. Id. at *23-*25.
289. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
290. Id. at 908-09.
291. Id. at 906; see also York v. Town of Limington, Maine, No. Civ. 03-99-P-H, 2004
WL 114985, at *5 (D. Me. Jan. 22, 2004).
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growth caps, are temporary restrictions, or a form of moratoria.292 Courts
will uphold moratoria that are necessary to protect the public health, safety,
and welfare.293 Accordingly, courts have upheld moratoria based on the need
to plan to avoid problems caused by future growth, or to cure existing prob-
lems caused by prior development.294
Moratoria that are reasonably limited in scope and duration, and have a
firmly fixed termination point will be upheld.2 95 This is to be distinguished
from moratoria of excessive or unlimited duration, which are generally held
to be unreasonable.296 Government has a duty to expeditiously take steps to
rectify the problem upon which the moratorium is based.297
A transportation concurrency moratorium under Florida law was upheld
in WCI Communities, Inc. v. City of Coral Springs.298 The City of Coral
Springs enacted a nine month temporary moratorium on the processing of
site plan applications for townhouse and multi-family development. 299 WCI
filed suit claiming that the moratorium constituted procedural and substan-
tive due process, and property rights violations, and that it prevented WCI
from using its multi-family parcels for multi-family residential develop-
ment.30
The court held:
[T]he city's use of zoning in progress and its adoption of a tempo-
rary moratorium in the processing of multi-family development
applications did not deprive WCI of any substantive due process
rights or affect a temporary taking .... Under both substantive due
process and equal protection, when the legislation being chal-
lenged does not target a protected class, the rational basis test is
applied. The rational basis standard is highly deferential [and as
292. See Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 285 N.E. 2d 291, 307-08 (N.Y. 1972).
293. City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 159 (Fla. 4th Dist Ct. App.
1979) (per curiam).
294. Golden, 285 N.E. 2d at 304-05.
295. See Franklin Cnty. v. Leisure Props., Ltd., 430 So. 2d 475, 481 (Ha. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (per curium) (upholding a three year moratorium on the issuance of building per-
mits for multi-family construction as a means of maintaining the status quo during the adop-
tion of a new comprehensive plan); Deal Gardens, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. Loch Arbour, 226 A.2d
607,612 (N.J. 1967).
296. Richard J. Grosso & David J. Russ, Takings Law in Florida: Ramifications of Tak-
ings Clauses, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 431, 485 (1993).
297. See Smoke Rise Inc. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitation Comm'n, 400 F. Supp. 1369,
1386-87 (D. Md. 1975).
298. 885 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
299. Id. at913.
300. Id. at913-14.
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such a] court should not set aside the determination of public of-
ficers in land use matters unless it is clear that their action has no
foundation in reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise
of power having no substantial relation to the public health, the
public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper
sense. The question is only whether a rational relationship exists
between the ordinance and a conceivable legitimate governmental
objective. If the question is at least debatable, there is no substan-
tive due process violation.
30
'
The court found it to be "well-settled that permissible bases for land use
restrictions include concern about the effect of the proposed development on
traffic, on congestion, on surrounding property values, on demand for city
services, and on other aspects of the general welfare., 302  The moratoria
served the valid purpose of preventing development inconsistent with pend-
ing changes in development regulations, and thus was rationally related to
city's attempt to preserve status quo while it formulated regulatory land use
scheme and so did not violate due process.30 3
Cases in which development moratoria have been upheld include Brad-
fordville Phipps Ltd. Partnership v. Leon County,30 which observed that
moratoria are a vital, valid part of a Florida local government's zoning pow-
er.305 Bradforville rejected a claim that a court-ordered injunction requiring a
moratoria (and the subsequent moratoria enacted by the local government)
constituted a taking.3" The temporary nature of the restriction, and the fact
that the Plaintiff purchased its property with actual or constructive notice of
the highly restrictive land use environment that existed, were factors in the
court's decision.
The court noted that:
The widespread invalidation of temporary planning moratoria
would deprive state and local governments of an important land-
use planning tool with a well-established tradition. Land-use
planning is necessarily a complex, time-consuming undertaking
for a community, especially in a situation as unique as this. In
several ways, temporary development moratoria promote effective
planning. First, by preserving the status quo during the planning
301. Id. at 914 (citations omitted).
302. Id. at 915.
303. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 885 So. 2d at 915-916.
304. 804 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
305. Id. at 470.
306. Id. at471-72.
307. Id. at 468.
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process, temporary moratoria ensure that a community's problems
are not exacerbated during the time it takes to formulate a regula-
tory scheme. Relatedly temporary development moratoria prevent
developers and landowners from racing to carry out development
that is destructive of the community's interests before a new plan
goes into effect. Such a race-to-development would permit prop-
erty owners to evade the land-use plan and undermine its goals.
Finally, the breathing room provided by temporary moratoria helps
ensure that the planning process is responsive to the property own-
ers and citizens who will be affected by the resulting land-use reg-
ulations. 30
8
D. Strict Planning and Zoning Allowances in Florida
Local governments in Florida can maintain existing planning and zon-
ing designations and deny requested use, density, and intensity increases, as
a means of protecting the carrying capacity and sustainability of its natural
and public resources.
Decisions to deny requested land use amendments based on these con-
siderations are likely to be upheld if challenged .3° The Supreme Court of
Florida has upheld local government authority to decline requested plan
amendments to allow an increase in density.310 Such decisions are legislative
in character, and will only be overturned if not "fairly debatable," a highly
deferential standard for local governments. 31' A local government's decision
not to change its plan will be upheld when any valid planning rationale sup-
ports the decision.31
In determining whether a regulation denies a landowner all economical-
ly viable use, the focus is on the existence and value of permissible uses.3 13
There is no right to any level of development land use, such as residential,
commercial, or industrial, as long as the allowed uses are economically via-
ble.314 As long as agricultural or some other non-construction use is econom-
ically viable, regulations may preclude any substantial, or even all, develop-
ment.315 In Martin County v. Yusem, 3 16 the Supreme Court of Florida upheld
308. Id. at 470 (quoting Keshbro, Inc. v. Miami, 801 So. 2d 864, 874 (Fla. 2001)).
309. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Brevard Cnty. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 471 (Fla.
1993).
310. Id. at475.
311. Id. at 472.
312. Martin Cnty. v. Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288, 1295 (Fla. 1997); Martin Cnty. v. Section
28 P'ship, 668 So. 2d 672, 677 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
313. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96(1981).
314. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018-19 (1992).
315. See generally Yusem, 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
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a county's decision to deny a request to "up-zone" agricultural lands, finding
that the county was not required to amend its comprehensive plan at the lan-
downer's request.317 The court held that landowners do not have a right to
density increases and ruled that decisions to deny requests for comprehensive
plan changes "are legislative decisions subject to the [deferential] fairly de-
batable standard of review.
318
In Martin County v. Section 28 Partnership,1 9 the Fourth District re-
jected a taking claim against Martin County's decision not to amend its com-
prehensive plan to change agricultural zoning. 320 The court held that such
decisions "will not be considered arbitrary and capricious if [they have] 'a
rational relationship with a legitimate general welfare concern.' ' 32' The
Court found that "The record contains sufficient evidence establishing that
the County's comprehensive plan policies are based on rational and sound
planning principles, designed to preserve agricultural lands, protect wetlands
and environmental resources, ensure the efficient use of public resources,
and discourage urban sprawl" and that because of the extent of the impact
from the proposed density increase, the refusal to amend the plan bore "a
substantial relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.,
322
Thus, if agricultural or other non-intensive development uses are eco-
nonically viable, local governments will typically be well within their police
power and without takings liability if they decline to approve rezoning or
comprehensive plan amendments on agricultural lands. Beyond maintaining
existing planning and zoning designations, local governments may also re-
duce allowable uses, densities, and intensities so long as the reductions do
not "go too far." As a matter of constitutional takings law, landowners do
not have a vested right to the continuation of current zoning, which can be
reduced for valid reasons.323 Because an owner is not guaranteed the most
profitable use of his land but simply some use that can be economically car-
fied out, an action which "down-zones" land or increases legitimate restric-
tions is not invalid simply because it denies the highest and best use of the
property.34 Regulatory actions have been upheld against takings claims even
316. 690 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1997).
317. Id. at 1290.
318. Id. at 1295.
319. 772 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
320. Id. at 621.
321. Id. at 620 (quoting Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208 (1lth Cir.
1995)).
322. Id. at 621.
323. Smith v. City of Clearwater, 383 So. 2d 681, 688-89 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
324. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
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where they dramatically diminished the value of the property, including im-
pacts potentially as great as 95 percent.325
In Florida, so long as the approved zoning allows some economically
viable use, a landowner is not entitled to more favorable or economically
valuable zoning.326 In Lee County v. Morales,327 the Second District rejected
a takings claim against a "down-zoning" because the resulting densities were
economically viable and the reductions were not made arbitrarily, but for
valid planning reasons based on a study.328 The court found that the county
acted within its discretion to revise the zoning allowances based upon the
new information presently available.3
29
Changes to local government comprehensive plans that reduce allowa-
ble densities have specifically been addressed as potential takings. In Glis-
son v. Alachua County,330 plan amendments that reduced density from one
unit per acre to one unit per five acres, were not held to be takings since the
change was not arbitrary, and the remaining uses were economically via-
ble.33' The validity of the amendments was strongly supported by the fact
that they were adopted pursuant to the authority of Florida's growth man-
agement laws. 3 2 "Down-zoning" or increasing land use restrictions are a
viable, legal option for ensuring that the impacts of development or other
land uses do exceed the capacity of natural or man-made systems to accom-
modate their impacts.333
Thus, local governments' hands are not tied when it comes to changing
existing planning and zoning provisions. If existing rules are no longer ap-
propriate, government is not precluded from making changes that reflect
current information.334 Planning and zoning is not a perfect science and is
325. Susan L. Trevarthen, Advising the Client Regarding Protection of Property Rights:
Harris Act and Inverse Condemnation Claims, FLA. B. J. July/August 2004, 61,61; see Hada-
check v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (reducing property value by over 90 percent); Gra-
ham v. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla. 1981) (75 percent reduction of value
not a taking); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (in some cases regulations may result
in a 95 percent loss without justifying compensation as a taking).
326. See Lee Cnty. v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App 1990).
327. 557 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
328. Id. at 655-56.
329. Id. at 656.
330. 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
331. Id. at 1037-38.
332. Id. at 1036.
333. See Town of Hialeah Gardens v. Hebraica Cmty. Ctr., Inc., 309 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d
Dist. C. App. 1975).
334. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (ruling that the denial
of a permit under the Endangered Species Act did not interfere with the landowner's reasona-
ble investment backed expectation, even though the landowner had purchased the land prior to
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often dependant on predicting the future and contingent on unknown factors.
Government has significant flexibility to reduce use or density or increase
restrictions, so long as the resulting rules allow some economically viable
use and are not arbitrary.
E. Transferrable Development Rights
Transferrable Development Rights are a potential mechanism that will
allow local governments to make substantial areas of ecological importance
off limits to development, while still retaining value in the impacted lands.335
If the enacted regulation permits most existing uses of the property, and pro-
vides a mechanism whereby individual landowners may transfer develop-
ment rights, the regulation does not deny individual landowners all economi-
cally viable uses of their property.336 In Glisson, the court acknowledged
that the county regulations diminished the economic value of the prop-
erty; however, diminution in value is not the test.337 Rather, a challenger
must demonstrate denial of all or a substantial portion of the beneficial uses
of the property.338
F. Growth Caps, Carrying Capacity Planning, and Property Rights
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,339 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a thirty-two month
moratorium that temporarily prohibited construction without compensating
affected landowners while studying the carrying capacity of the area and
formulating a regional plan for development. 340 The Court rejected the claim
that "a moratorium on development imposed during the process of devising a
comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per se taking of property requiring
the enactment of the ESA because, the owner could not have been "oblivious" to the rising
environmental awareness that occurred during the years between the purchase and the applica-
tion for a permit.).
335. A "TDR" program allows a private landowner to "sever his development rights in an
area where development is objectionable and transfer them to an area where development is
less objectionable." Andrew J. Miller, Transferable Development Rights in the Constitutional
Landscape: Has Penn Central Failed to Weather the Storm?, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 459, 465
(1999).
336. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104; see also Glisson v.
Alachua Cnty., 558 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App.1990).
337. Glisson, 558 So. 2d at 1037.
338. Id. at 1035.
339. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
340. Id. at 342-43.
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compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. 34'
The Court held that so long as some future interest remained, the per se rule
under Lucas342 did not apply to temporary building restrictions. 3 3 The Court
refrained from adopting an absolute rule regarding moratorium and instead,
suggested that an ad hoc analysis must be conducted using the Penn Central
factors to determine whether a taking had occurred. 34
A number of observations from the reported cases can be made about
the property rights implications of growth caps.
First, the contrast between the Florida cases of Boca Raton and Innkee-
pers Motor Lodge cases and the City of Hollywood case makes clear that the
established caps-be they density or intensity-related, or building permit-
related-must have resulted from some valid analysis or methodology re-
lated to a facility capacity, scientific determination of acceptable impact lim-
its, or other non-arbitrary approach other than pulling numbers "out of the
air."
Next, as noted by Pierce,345 courts are likely to strike growth limits that
respond to regional concerns beyond the strict limits of local government
boundaries unless a demonstration is made as to the important connection of
local impacts to the regional issue.
Third, like the Rate of Growth Restrictions in the Florida Keys, the
analysis of building permit caps discussed in Currier Builders v. Town of
346 ta uYork, suggests that such annual caps on the number of permits may be
viewed as somewhat unlike moratoria (in that they are not temporary), and
upheld even if permanent if they are based on an articulated methodology,
and provide an owner with some potential to make a viable use of his or her
land at some reasonable time in the future. In Currier Builders, a local or-
dinance, enacted by citizen referendum, and limiting the monthly and annual
number of building permits (issued under a lottery system) was challenged,
among other basis, as a taking of private property.347 The case was ultimate-
341. Id. at 306.
342. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) (A taking occurs as a
matter of law when the landowner is denied all economic beneficial uses in his land).
343. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 337.
344. Id. at 342.
345. Pierce, supra note 7, at 115. Pierce criticized the Court's analysis as "shallow,"
noting that "certain aspects of Florida's geography and environment might make it suffer
more under national air quality standards-possibly because poor air quality affects the pro-
duction of oranges, or because it deters tourist travel to the city." Id.
346. 146 F. Supp. 2d 71 (D. Me. 2001).
347. Id. at 72.
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ly dismissed on ripeness grounds, but its long history included a Magistrate
Judge's analysis that rejected the takings challenge. 4 8
Ultimately, a court will look at the overall validity of the growth ordin-
ance in conjunction with whether there is a taking of property from the lan-
downer in making its determination of whether the government entity can
limit growth and development. Growth limiting ordinances will remain an
important tool for local governments as demand for developable land in-
creases and encroachment on environmentally sensitive lands becomes im-
minent. Such ordinances should serve to promote infill development and
protect our natural resources.
G. Large Scale Rural Planning
Florida's Community Planning Act encourages large-scale rural devel-
opment planning, expressly providing for two types of projects-Sector
Plans349 and Rural Land Stewardship Projects35 -which authorize local land
use plan amendments for very large parcels which allow substantial urban
development in exchange for substantial set-asides of farmland or environ-
mentally sensitive lands.
These provisions are controversial from the standpoint of whether, by
its terms or in application, the public benefits in terms of long-term preserva-
tion of important resources are equal to the private benefits resulting from
substantial increases in development potential on lands typically far from
existing urban areas. Yet, they offer an exceptionally useful vehicle for the
large-scale preservation of ecosystem lands in locations, amounts and quality
that are adequate to ensure the sustainability of ecosystems. The ability to
essentially "site plan" a several thousand acre parcel in single ownership, in
terms of where development will happen and where preservation will occur,
at the development approval stage (a comprehensive land use plan amend-
ment) where government enjoys the greatest amount of discretion35' and lan-
downers have not already been granted substantial development rights, and
before land has been parceled off into small units owned by dozens, hun-
dreds or even thousands of owners, offers the most effective method for go-
vernmental decision-making that ensures the sustainability of ecological
functions. Surely, as described above, the ability of permitting agencies to
deny or limit permits based on ecosystem sustainability requirements exists
in the law. Yet, in many instances, the denial or the grant of a very limited
348. Id!
349. FLA. STAT. § 163.3245 (2010).
350. Id. § 163.3177.
351. See discussion at pp. 759-62.
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wetland or wildlife "incidental take" permit, for example, for land that is
entirely or nearly all wetlands or protected wildlife habitat-as a result, per-
haps, of subdivision and sales-and which has already been planned or
zoned for urban uses, can be very difficult or impossible as a result of per-
ceived or real property rights violations.
IV. IMPACT FEES AND EXACTIONS: MAXIMIZING THE PUBLIC'S ABILITY TO
RECOUP ITS COSTS IN THE FACE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Florida Laws and Programs Designed To Have Development Pay For
Itself
Neither constitutional nor statutory law requires Florida to subsidize fi-
nancially new development and population growth. Government (local,
county, municipal, or special district)-imposed impact fees equal to 100 per-
cent of development costs are not constitutionally (Federal or Florida) or
statutorily prohibited. Thus, while we may not be able to "build a fence at
the state line," we can build a toll plaza and charge the full amount that it
will cost to provide the full range of public facilities and services required to
meet the needs of all new population.
1. Impact Fees, the Constitution, and Florida Statutes
No Federal or Florida statute specifically caps, or sets a maximum mon-
etary limit, for impact fees imposed by a counties, municipalities, or special
districts. Section 163.31801, the "Florida Impact Fee Act," does not set a
cap on impact fees. Rather, under section 163.31801(3), impact fees are
subject to requirements regarding their form of adoption, advance notice,
method of calculation (based on the most recent and localized data); account-
ing and reporting; and other procedural and accountability requirements.
In Florida, the amount of allowable impact fees are governed primarily
by case law, rather than by statute. Impact fees are analyzed legally under
the Takings Clause as exactions.352 The Takings Clause, Amendment V of
the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the states through amendment XIV
of the U.S. Constitution, provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation. 3 53 The Florida Constitution, under
Article X, section 6(a), is essentially the same, but requires "full" compensa-
tion. 3 4 Analyzed together, the Supreme Court of the United States' opinions
352. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391, 404 (1994).
353. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
354. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
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in the Nollan v. California Coastal Commission355 and Dolan cases, require
that an exaction, such as a mandated developmental impact fee, must meet
two tests: 1) There must be an "essential nexus" between the exaction and a
legitimate state interest that it serves; and 2) The exaction must be "roughly
proportional" to the nature and extent of the project's impact.356
In determining whether the imposition of an impact fee is constitution-
ally permissible, the Supreme Court of Florida has adopted the "dual rational
nexus test," similar to the Supreme Court of the United States' "rough pro-
portionality" test, which requires the local government to demonstrate "a
reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the need for additional
capital facilities and the growth in population generated by the [develop-
ment]" and "a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the ex-
penditures of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the [develop-
ment]. 357
Thus, so long as the impact fee or exaction is in fact calculated to offset
no more than 100 percent of the development's public facility and service
requirements, government may charge that amount.358 Under Florida law, a
municipality, county, or special district does not violate constitutional re-
straints by levying impact fees equal to 100 percent of development costs.
359
The courts, however, must review each assessed impact fee on a case by case
basis by applying the "dual rational nexus test" to ensure that the fee charged
is proportional to the anticipated impact on jurisdictional resources and ser-
vices.3 °
V. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW SUPPORT PLANNING AND
REGULATION BASED ON ECOLOGICAL OR OTHER THRESHOLDS
At least one commentator has concluded that municipalities seeking to
implement no-growth controls "must create an irrefutable link between land
use management and the science of sustainability so that courts may see sus-
355. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
356. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (holding the city failed to
establish that in issuing a permit to petitioner, its property dedication requirement was roughly
proportionate to its land use plan and the impact of petitioner's proposed development).
357. Save Our Septic Sys. Comm., Inc. v. Sarasota Cnty., 957 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2007); see also St. Johns Cnty. v. N.E. Fla. Builders Ass'n, 583 So. 2d 635, 637
(Fla. 1991) (citing Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 431 So. 2d 606, 611-612 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1983)).
358. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
359. See id.
360. Save Our Septic Sys. Comm., Inc., 957 So. 2d at 673.
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tainability concepts as rational and conclusive. '361 While that author's view
on this point may reflect his valid, realistic view of the judiciary's gut-level
reactions to such ordinances,362 an analysis of the standards for judicial re-
view of land use regulations demonstrates that a mere "rational basis" for
such regulations, and not an "irrefutable link," is necessary to uphold such
land use restrictions in the face of most facial constitutional challenges how-
ever. In determining whether regulations are arbitrary, or legitimate subjects
of regulations, courts give significant deference to the judgment of the regu-
lating body.363 Property rights claims, on the other hand, may be the greatest
obstacle to the adoption of "no growth" ordinances that truly and permanent-
ly prevent any reasonable use of individual parcels of land.
364
"The State is given wide range in exercising its lawful powers to regu-
late land use for environmental reasons, and any such land-use regulations
thus are valid if supported by a rational basis consistent with overall policies
of the State.""36
As long as an ordinance or regulation bears a substantial relationship to
the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, it is
constitutional.366 Local governments have a statutory right and responsibility
to enact comprehensive plans and such plans, like legislative acts, will be
presumed valid when challenged.367 Absent a showing that the comprehen-
sive plan is unreasonable and is an arbitrary exercise of police power without
any relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare, the courts
will not overturn the plan.368 The burden is on the party challenging an or-
dinance to make this demonstration.369
To resolve this issue, courts utilize the "fairly debatable" test, under
which, if reasonable minds could differ as to the reasonableness or rationality
of an ordinance, the ordinance will be upheld.370 A plan will be deemed fair-
ly debatable if there is competent, substantial evidence to support the local
361. See Pierce, supra note 7, at 96.
362. Id.
363. Town of Hialeah Gardens v. Hebraica Cmty. Ctr., Inc., 309 So. 2d 212, 214 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
364. Dep't. of Cmty. Aff. v. Moorman, 664 So. 2d 930, 933 (Fla. 1995)
365. Id.; see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Brevard Cnty. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 473
(Fla. 1993).
366. Davis v. Sails, 318 So. 2d 214,217 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
367. Id.; City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1953) (en banc) (per
curium).
368. City of Boca Raton v. Boca Villas Corp., 371 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (per curiam).
369. City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1957).
370. Davis, 318 So. 2d at 217.
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government's decision.37' If the plan is found to be fairly debatable, then its
application cannot be disturbed by the courts. 372 Only where a plan is not
supported by any substantial evidence and is not fairly debatable, will it be
deemed arbitrary, capricious, and a denial of due process.373 To show that a
land use restriction is unreasonable and arbitrary, the challenging party must
prove that the restriction has no rational relationship to the public health,
morals, safety or general welfare, and is not reasonably designed to correct
the adverse condition.374 Once the plan meets the fairly debatable test, the
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the local government.375
The essence of these cases is that as long as there is a good reason for
the regulation, it will not be struck by the Court because the challenger disa-
grees with that reason. In Capeletti Bros., the court upheld the denial of a
rezoning on the basis that it conflicted with existing land use plans and the
concern. 376 Differences of opinion on this matter did not invalidate the or-
dinance on the basis that conclusive proof of the need to deny the rezoning
did not exist. Instead, this demonstrated that the issue was fairly debatable
and thus within the Commission's discretion to decide.377 Importantly, the
court explained that, due to the sensitivity of decisions affecting land use,
those decisions should be made by local governments, and unless the deci-
sions are arbitrary, discriminatory, or unconstitutional, the court should let
those decisions stand.378 Similarly, the court in Morales stated that because
zoning is a legislative function, the courts should only intervene when the
action of the zoning body is so unreasonable and unjustified as to amount to
a taking.379 The Court further held that it is not for the judiciary to determine
what would be the proper zoning, but to ascertain whether the zoning body's
decision is fairly debatable.38°
A. Regulating in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty
Scientific conclusions are, by their nature, subject to uncertainty and /
or controversy and debate among experts. Federal courts and Florida courts
371. Lee Cnty. v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
372. Davis, 318 So. 2d at 217.
373. Broward Cnty. v. Capeletti Bros., 375 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
374. City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332, 1336 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1983).
375. Davis, 318 So. 2d at 221.
376. 375 So. 2d at 316.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 315; see also City of Miami v. Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 1957).
379. Lee Cnty. v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652, 655 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
380. Id.
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give deference to the government on such matters.38' Deference to an agen-
cy's scientific expertise is mandated when the agency articulates a rational
connection between the facts and its conclusion.382 When an agency decision
involves a high level of technical and scientific expertise, a court will defer
to the agency's conclusions, so long as they are reasonable.383 Where the
"analysis of the relevant documents 'requires a high level of technical exper-
tise,' [a court] must defer to the 'informed discretion of the responsible fed-
eral agencies."' 384  A reviewing court should be at its most deferential in
reviewing an agency's scientific determinations in an area within the agen-
385cy's expertise.
In a Florida case, Island Harbor Beach Club, Ltd. v. Department of
Natural Resources,38 6 the Florida Department of Natural Resources em-
ployed a new scientific methodology, which was allegedly unproven and
unaccepted in the scientific community, in reestablishing a coastal construc-
tion control line.387 The court held that "selection and use of new scientific
methodology was a matter of agency discretion that should not be set aside
absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence that the agency's action is
either arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not reasonably related
to the statutory purpose. 388 The court concluded by stating that the setting
of coastal construction control lines for the purpose of adequately protecting
the beaches and dunes of this state is not a matter of scientific certainty and
thus, the court was compelled to give great deference to DNR.389
381. See Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 361 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir.
2004), amended by 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, U.S. 402, 416 (1971), overruled on other grounds by, Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99, 105 (1977)).
382. Ocean Advocates, 361 F.3d at 1119.
383. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008).
384. Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club,
427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)).(1989).
385. Bait. Gas & Elec. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
386. 495 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
387. Id. at 223.
388. Id. at 217-18; see e.g., Bait. Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 103 (stating that the uncertainty
of science only serves to emphasize the limitation of judicial review and the need for greater
deference to policy making entities).
389. Island Harbour Beach Club, Ltd., 495 So. 2d at 223; accord Davis v. Sails, 318 So.
2d 214, 222 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975); see also Lee Cnty. v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652,655
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (The rationality and reasonableness of a downzoning, which was
based upon an expert's study and the planning staffs assessments and recommendations that
the land be rezoned in consideration of environmental, archaeological, and historical protec-
tion/preservation, was fairly debatable); see also City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d
148, 152 (Fla. 1953) (en banc) (per curiam) (If any logical deduction supports the local gov-
ernment's contentions, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the local govern-
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In Ecology Center v. Castaneda,39 ° the court upheld the U.S. Forest
Service's approval of timber sales and restoration projects in a National For-
est against a challenge from environmental interests.39' Upholding the agen-
cy action under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary and
capricious" standard,392 and the applicable "best available science" rule, the
court observed the rule that it should grant "considerable discretion to agen-
cies on matters 'requir[ing] a high level of technical expertise. ' 393 Address-
ing the issue of competing scientific positions head-on, the court found that
"Though a party may cite studies that support a conclusion different from the
one the Forest Service reached, it is not our role to weigh competing scientif-
ic analyses. 394
Short of proving that the agency's "analysis is outdated or flawed," the
Plaintiffs could not meet their burden, said the court, by relying on other
science that suggested a different scientific determination than was made by
the agency.395
The Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in Haire v. Florida Depart-
ment of Agriculture & Consumer Services,396 which upheld Florida's citrus
canker eradication statute and program against constitutional and scientific
challenges, contains an excellent discussion of these principles.397 The trial
court had invalidated the state's program of destroying all citrus trees within
1900 feet of a canker- infested citrus tree, disagreeing with the study from
which the 1900 foot destruction radius was derived.398 The trial court was
ment); see also Graham v. Estuary Props., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Fla. 1981) (Agency deci-
sion to give great weight to environmental impact of proposed development was within the
realm of its responsibilities and the court would not substitute its judgment for the agency's
when it was backed by competent evidence.).
390. 574 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2009).
391. Id. at 659-60.
392. Id. at 656. Described by the court, consistent with the prevailing precedent, as "nar-
row," under which it could "not substitute [their] judgment for that of the agency." Id.
393. Id. at 658-59 (citing Marsh v. Or. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377, (1989)).
394. Ecology Ctr., 574 F.3d at 659 (citing Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 988
(9th Cir. 2008) (noting that it is not the proper role of the court to "act as a panel of scientists
that instructs the Forest Service how to validate its hypotheses regarding wildlife viability,
chooses among scientific studies in determining whether the Forest Service has complied
with the underlying Forest Plan, and orders the agency to explain every possible scientific
uncertainty"); Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1992) ("To set
aside the Service's determination in this case would require us to decide that the views of
Greenpeace's experts have more merit than those of the Service's experts, a position we are
unqualified to take.").
395. Castaneda, 574 F. 3d at 659-60.
396. 870 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 2004).
397. Id. at 777.
398. Id. at 786.
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persuaded by the fact that the Legislature had not held fact-finding hearings
related to the underlying study.399 On appeal, the Fourth District, and then
the Supreme Court of Florida, reversed, ruling that the trial court "erred in
rejecting the legislative choice based on its own view of the scientific evi-
dence and improperly substituted its judgment for that of the Legislature,
which determined that the 1900-feet eradication zone was justified by the
best available science.4°° The Court noted that the legislation has a rational
basis and was not scientifically arbitrary, as it was supported by published,
peer-reviewed scientific studies, the recommendation of a technical advisory
board, and the state's practical experience with citrus canker. That this
science was disputed did not invalidate the resulting regulation:
The fact that the Legislature did not subject the []report to an ad-
versarial trial or the requirements of courtroom admissibility under
the Frye test does not make the Legislature's action in adopting the
1900-foot removal radius arbitrary or capricious, or not reasonably
related to the goal of citrus canker eradication. In addition, the fact
that the trial court heard testimony during a ten-day hearing, whe-
reas the Legislature did not, is not a significant consideration under
rational basis review. That there was conflicting evidence pre-
sented to the trial court regarding the appropriateness of [the
Study's] methods indicates that the issue of whether to adopt [the
Study's] conclusions was a matter of debate for the Legislature.401
Citing federal law, the Court unequivocally rejected the notion that
government could not regulate in the face of scientific debate or uncertainty:
"[L]egislatures are not limited to acting only where there is scientific certain-
ty."'40 2 "'To make scientific precision a criterion of constitutional power
would be to subject the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic
principles of our government ....
In a case decided under state law, a New Mexico appellate court upheld
the state's adoption of a numeric human health standard for uranium in
groundwater, rejecting a challenge to its scientific basis.4°4 The standard had
been the subject of extensive public hearings and debate, and reflected the
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Haire, 870 So. 2d at 786.
402. Id. (citing Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F. 3d 484, 504 (6th Cir. 2002)).
403. Id. (quoting Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932)).
404. NMAC N.M. Mining Ass'n v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm'n, 150 P.3d 991,
1002 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (amending N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.2).
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opinions of human health experts employed by the relevant state agency. 4
05
The Court rejected the challenge to the underlying science:
[The agency] is not required to support its finding that a significant
risk exists with anything approaching scientific certainty.... [The
statute] specifically allows the Secretary to regulate on the basis of
the 'best available evidence.' . . . [T]his provision requires a re-
viewing court to give [the agency] some leeway where its findings
must be made on the frontiers of scientific knowledge. Thus, so
long as they are supported by a body of reputable scientific
thought, the [a]gency is free to use conservative assumptions in in-
terpreting the data with respect to carcinogens, risking error on the
side of overprotection rather than underprotection.
406
The precautionary principle suggested in the Haire and Amend Ground
Water Quality Standards4°7 cases was explicated at length by the Supreme
Court of Hawaii in its rulings on challenges to a state agency's actions regu-
lating the consumptive use of water.40 8 The court upheld the Hawaii Com-
mission on Water Resources Management's limited grant of water use rights
based on its invocation of "precautionary principles," which was defined as
meaning that: "[W]here there are present or potential threats of serious dam-
age, lack of full scientific certainty should not be a basis for postponing ef-
fective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 'Awaiting for cer-
tainty will often allow for only reactive, not preventive, regulatory ac-
tion."' 409
"Where uncertainty exists," wrote the Court, "a trustee's duty to protect
the resource mitigates in favor of choosing presumptions that also protect the
resource." 410 The "absence of firm scientific proof should not tie the Com-
mission's hands in adopting reasonable measures designed to further the
public interest. 4
1
'
In language of direct relevance to the setting of environmental standards
in several arenas, including water allocations, water quality standards and
others, the court found that:
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. 141 N.M. 41 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006).
408. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 466 (Haw. 2000).
409. Id. at 466 (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 29 (D.C. Cir.
1976)).
410. Id. at 466 (citing Lead Indus. Ass'n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 647 F.2d 1130,
1152-56 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
411. Id. at 467.
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In requiring the Commission to establish instream flow standards
at an early planning stage, the Code contemplates the designation
of the standards based not only on scientifically proven facts, but
also on future predictions, generalized assumptions, and policy
judgments. Neither the constitution nor Code, therefore, con-
strains the Commission to wait for full scientific certainty in fulfil-
ling its duty towards the public interest in minimum instream
flows .... Uncertainty regarding the exact level of protection ne-
cessary justifies neither the least protection feasible nor the ab-
sence of protection.
4 12
The court noted that erring on the side of allowing additional environ-
mental impacts (in this case from additional water allocations) created the
potential for "unknown impairment and risk" and "could drain a stream dry
incrementally, or leave a diverted stream dry in perpetuity, without ever de-
termining the appropriate instream flows. Needless to say, we cannot accept
such a proposition."4"3
On the other hand, the court did not require the Commission to take an
overly-strict approach and allocate no water to private users for the several
year period it would take to complete the scientific review necessary to re-
solve the current uncertainty. Instead, the water commission must apply "a
methodology that recognizes the preliminary and incomplete nature of exist-
ing evidence, ... and, indeed, incorporates elements of uncertainty and risk
as part of its analysis. Such a methodology, by its nature, must rely as much
on policy considerations as on hard scientific 'facts.
'
'
41 4
In furtherance of its trust obligations, the Commission may make
reasonable precautionary presumptions or allowances in the public
interest.4t 5 The Commission may still act when public benefits
and risks are not capable of exact quantification. At all times,
however, the Commission should not hide behind scientific uncer-
tainty, but should confront it as systematically and judiciously as
possible-considering every offstream use in view of the cumulative
potential harm to instream uses and values and the need for mea-
ningful studies of stream flow requirements. We do not expect
412. Id.
413. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 470-71.
414. Id. at 471 (citing Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 29 (The Commission "must act, in part on
factual issues, but largely on choices of policy, on an assessment of risks, and on predictions
dealing with matters on the frontiers of scientific knowledge.") (brackets and internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
415. Id. at 466.
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this to be an easy task. Yet it is nothing novel to the administrative
function or the legal process in general.416
The Supreme Court of Hawaii opinion quoted heavily from Ethyl Corp.
where the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the
Environmental Protection Agency's authority under the Clean Air Act to
regulate in the face of scientific uncertainty.417 The Hawaii Court found the
Ethyl Corp.'s opinion's policy discussion, made in the context of human
health concerns, relevant to environmental issues:
Regulators . . . must be accorded flexibility, a flexibility that re-
cognizes the special judicial interest in favor of protection of the
health and welfare of people, even in areas where certainty does
not exist.
Questions involving the environment are particularly prone to un-
certainty .... Yet the statutes-and common sense-demand regu-
latory action to prevent harm, even if the regulator is less than cer-
tain that harm is otherwise inevitable.
Undoubtedly, certainty is the scientific ideal-to the extent that
even science can be certain of its truth .... Awaiting certainty,
[however,] will often allow for only reactive, not preventive, regu-
lation. Petitioners suggest that anything less than certainty, that
any speculation, is irresponsible. But when statutes seek to avoid
environmental catastrophe, can preventative, albeit uncertain, deci-
sions legitimately be so labeled? 4
In Florida, in the context of local government comprehensive planning
decisions, local governments are encouraged to use any data necessary so
long as methodologies are professionally applied, collected, and accepted.
Comprehensive plans should be based on whatever data a local government
does have, even if that data is not complete.41 9
416. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 28 n.58 (explaining how "assessment of risk is a normal
part of judicial and administrative fact-finding").
417. Id. at 28.
418. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For further discussion of the pre-
cautionary principle, see Lead Indus. Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 647 F.2d 1130, 1152-56
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992); see generally Gregory D. Ful-
lem, Comment, The Precautionary Principle: Environmental Protection in the Face of Scien-
tific Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 495 (1995).
419. Envtl. Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. Broward County, 586 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
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"Protection of environmentally sensitive areas and pollution prevention
are legitimate concerns within the police power., 420 In Morales, the court
upheld a down-zoning, based on an expert study, of a barrier island which
was designed to preserve archaeological resources, protect the environment
and adjoining aquatic preserve, and to guard against the threat by hurricanes
and flooding to development.4 2' Florida courts also have recognized a local
government's legislation to protect their community's appearance as a legi-
timate exercise of police power.4 2 Likewise, the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States has ruled that preservation of open space and protection from urba-
nization and the consequences of urban sprawl, e.g., water pollution, destruc-
tion of scenic beauty, disturbance of the ecology and environment, are valid
public interests and legitimate governmental goals.
423
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida can only sustain itself and avoid economic and ecological crisis
if its policies and laws respect and reflect the realities of the laws of nature,
the finite (and shrinking) amount of land in this peninsula, and its ability to
pay for more growth. Growth management must become, in some places, a
growth limitation and where and when development can occur. Certainly,
the potential impact of sea-level rise alone constitutes "data and analysis"
relative to whether proposed land uses, densities, and locations would meet
the terms and intent of Florida's land use planning law.
We must have an honest and frank discussion about Florida's finite
amount of land, and financial and practical ability to sustain unlimited land
development. In a state whose natural environment, built communities, and
infrastructure are being overwhelmed by growth that is not paying for itself,
government can and must ensure that the public fiscal and welfare are not
harmed by the amount, type, and location of new development. Government
can require growth to truly pay for itself. It can also regulate land strictly;
even adopt annual growth caps, if important to ecosystem, farmland and
community protection. It can maintain a tax system and fiscal policies that
420. Morales, 557 So. 2d at 655.
421. Lee Cnty. v. Morales, 557 So. 2d 652, 653 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990). The court
found that "the Zoning Board was appropriately concerned with limiting the effects of future
commercial development . . . in view of legitimate environmental concerns, public safety
concerns, and concern for preserving the island's aesthetic, historical, and archeological cha-
racteristics." Id. at 655.
422. City of Sunrise v. D.C.A. Homes, Inc., 421 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (per curiam).
423. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 n.7-8 (1981).
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work in the same direction as the rules. We must be able to talk about carry-
ing capacity limits in polite company and government buildings.
Ultimately, while the law does not require government to watch hel-
plessly while population growth results in the more loss of the basic life
functions provided by the air, land, and water, protecting those necessities
will require changes in the individual footprint of development and individu-
als. Indeed, as population growth continues, more people will need more
drinkable water, fishing grounds, features like floodplains and dunes to pre-
vent storm damage, land for growing and raising food, and places to enjoy
their lives and the world recreating and relaxing in the great outdoors.
The federal and state laws governing planning and environmental per-
mitting decisions in Florida and elsewhere provide government ample au-
thority to ensure the sustainability of fiscal and ecological resources. Appli-
cable judicial standards of review recognize and defer to the need for legisla-
tive and executive branch agencies to regulate and act in response to valid
science and methodologies, and do not preclude such action in the face of
(almost always present) technical or scientific debate. The discretion granted
to agencies allows them to use their best judgment, and decisions that do not
zealously ensure the long-term public interest may well be upheld upon chal-
lenge because a reviewing court cannot conclude that they are "arbitrary or
capricious" or violative of a similarly deferential specific statutory review
standard. But decisions that do give the benefit of the doubt to environmen-
tal, human health, the protection of taxpayer dollars, and other public interest
considerations will just as surely be upheld, and property rights and other
constitutional limits would intervene only in rare situations to prevent their
implementation. The law allows and usually requires government to plan
and regulate to ensure sustainability. Judicial standards of review are much
more a limitation on the practical ability of environmental and taxpayers
interests to challenge individual action as unsustainable than an impediment
to aggressive governmental protection of the public interest. It is the election
and appointment of public servants unwilling or unable to act boldly to pro-
tect the future of the places over which they have jurisdiction, not the courts
and the Constitution, which is the critical impediment to sustainability.
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